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 This study applies environmental criminology and situational crime prevention (SCP) to 
study successful and unsuccessful assassinations by terrorists. Using these perspectives, a series 
of hypotheses were devised to understand the situational factors that contribute to successful 
compared to unsuccessful assassinations. A random sample of roughly 1,000 successful and 
1,000 unsuccessful assassination attacks taking place between 2005 and 2014 was acquired from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Open source materials were then consulted to supplement 
the GTD with the creation of new SCP variables. The hypotheses were tested in a binary logistic 
regression, and additional regression models were created for 4 specific regions (the Middle East 
& North Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa). Results indicate support 
for the application of SCP and environmental criminology to the study of assassinations by 
terrorists. Specifically, successful assassinations are associated with guardianship, weapon type, 
target location, terrorist location, attack intensity, and distance. Findings are largely consistent 
across the different regions, however, the results from each regional model deviated slightly 
from the full model, indicating that the impact of certain SCP variables on successful 
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 This dissertation analyzes successful and unsuccessful terrorist assassination incidents 
through the framework of environmental criminology and situational crime prevention (SCP). It 
devises a series of hypotheses developed from the prior literature to identify characteristics 
associated with successful (i.e., the target was killed) assassination outcomes. The main analysis 
uses a random sample of 1,000 successful and 1,000 unsuccessful assassination incidents 
between 2005 and 2014 from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The hypotheses are tested 
in a series of binary logistic regression models.  
 Since the GTD provides limited details on assassination events, this dissertation 
innovatively expands the dataset by utilizing open source material to add new SCP variables that 
do not currently exist in any terrorism database. This approach allows for an improved and more 
refined test of the SCP framework compared to if only the GTD variables were relied upon. 
Importantly, this dissertation tests an additional 12 hypotheses, as opposed to only five 
hypotheses available from the GTD variables. Studies have successfully employed a similar 
strategy to examine maritime piracy by reviewing narratives published by the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) to code for SCP variables (Shane & Magnuson, 2014; Shane, Piza, & 
Mandala, 2015). Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilize this approach in their analysis of 100 
successful and 100 unsuccessful assassinations. This dissertation therefore extends the previous 
work conducted by Mandala and Freilich (2017a)1.  
																																																						
1 This dissertation extends Mandala and Freilich’s study (2017a) in five important ways. First, this dissertation uses 
an enhanced sample of roughly 2000 incidents, as opposed to 200, to better detect significant effects. Second, it 
includes 5 added hypotheses: H4: Attacks where suicide bombs are used, as opposed to other types of explosives, 
are more likely to result in a successful assassination; H10: Attacks that occur at the target's home are less likely to 
be successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or structures; H13: Incidents where terrorists attack 
from inside a motor vehicle, or while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in a successful assassination 
compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside (this hypothesis represents one of the only tests of Clarke 
and Newman’s (2006) tools opportunity pillar); H14: Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or 
structure are less likely to result in a successful assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from 
2 
	
The field of criminology has been slow to study terrorism and political violence (Freilich 
& LaFree, 2015). Some maintain that this is partly due to the difficulty in both defining and 
measuring terrorism (Freilich, Chermak, & Simone, 2009; LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). 
However, in recent years, the field has increasingly embraced the study of terrorism generally as 
well as specific terrorist tactics. Environmental criminology and SCP are also increasingly being 
applied to terrorism (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Freilich & Newman, 2009). In contrast to 
traditional criminology theories that stress distant causes of crime and why offenders commit 
crime, environmental criminology and SCP focus on the near causes and opportunities that 
facilitate a crime’s occurrence. In other words, the emphasis is on how the crime event is 
committed. Environmental criminology involves analyzing a crime’s environment to discover 
characteristics facilitating the crime’s occurrence (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). SCP is derived 
from environmental criminology and emphasizes the importance of analyzing specific forms of 
crime to develop prevention measures to disrupt crime opportunities.  
 While researchers have examined specific terrorist tactics through a criminological lens, 
such as suicide bombings, aerial hijackings, and kidnappings, the assassination tactic remains 
relatively understudied. Although recent studies by Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b) have 
used criminology to study assassinations by terrorists, most of the assassination research exists in 
fields outside of criminology, such as political science, history and psychology (Ben-Yehuda, 
1990). Research notes the political, psychological and cultural impact successful assassinations 
																																																																																																																																																																														
outside a building or structure; and H16: Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than the intended 
target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks that produce 
fewer collateral deaths. Third, this dissertation tests 2 fewer independent variables since it utilizes more categorical 
variables and therefore some variables are collapsed (i.e., security presence, others around, weapon type, target 
location, and terrorist location). Fourth, it includes the same control variables, except instead of “terrorists 
captured”, it incorporates “multiple terrorists present” since the open sources often do not provide information on 
whether or not any terrorists were captured. Finally, this dissertation also conducts an in-depth supplemental 
regional analysis for 4 regions (Middle East & North Africa; South Asia; Southeast Asia; Sub Saharan Africa), 
whereas Mandala and Freilich (2017a) do not conduct any regional analysis.  
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can have on individual countries as well as the world (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011; Appleton, 
2000; Childers, 2013; Freedman, 1984). For example, Freedman (1984) shows that many 
Americans were more shocked and depressed after President Kennedy’s assassination than they 
were by their own father’s death. A large portion of the literature on assassinations in the United 
States focuses on identifying the emotional and psychological factors motivating individual 
assassins, including those who targeted several U.S. presidents, including Kennedy, Lincoln and 
Reagan. Similarly, the United States Secret Service’s 1980-81 study analyzed the common 
psychological and behavioral characteristics of potentially dangerous individuals within the 
population (Heyman, 1984). The literature is mostly unempirical, rarely uses quantitative 
methods, and seldom investigates the incident-level. Instead, the assassination literature tends to 
examine case studies. 
Since a successful assassination can inflict substantial damage, a reliance on 
environmental criminology and SCP to help uncover opportunities for disrupting and preventing 
such attacks seems warranted. This dissertation begins by reviewing the definitions of 
assassination and terrorism in Chapter 1. It discusses the history of assassination, and highlights 
how this tactic is connected with terrorism. The chapter also reviews the assassination literature. 
Chapter 2 discusses environmental criminology and SCP and reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on its application to terrorism. Chapter 3 reviews the hypotheses. Chapter 4 
discusses the dissertation’s data and its dependent, independent and control variables. Chapter 5 
explains the study’s methodology, and Chapter 6 reviews the results of the analyses conducted. 
Chapter 7 discusses the implications of these results and Chapter 8 notes the study’s 
contributions, limitations, and the avenues for future research to explore. The conclusion 
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summarizes the main findings and their potential impact on counterterrorism practice, policy, 
and research. 
 
CH. 1: ASSASSINATION BACKGROUND 
 
Defining Assassination and Terrorism 
As noted, researchers encounter challenges in studying terrorism and political violence, 
particularly with defining these complex issues. In fact, there is currently no universally accepted 
definition of terrorism (Freilich et al., 2009; LaFree et al., 2015; Schmid & Jongman, 2005). 
Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) study of over 100 academic definitions of terrorism, as well as 
Weinberg, Penahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler’s (2004) examination of over 70 definitions, 
demonstrates the lack of consensus. Different branches of the U.S. government, like the FBI and 
U.S. State Department, even use different definitions of terrorism (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 
2009). Despite these varying definitions, many contain similar core elements (Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988; Weingberg et al., 2004; LaFree & Ackerman, 2009).  Most terrorism definitions 
require that the act involve non-state actors, violence or force, political motivations, the creation 
of fear, and making a threat (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Weingberg et al., 2004; LaFree & 
Ackerman, 2009). Interestingly, most academic definitions on terrorism exclude any 
psychological element (Weinberg et al., 2004).  
There are also several different definitions of assassination, but here too there are some 
commonalities. In one example, an assassination is defined in general terms as “the murder of (a 
usually prominent person) by a sudden/secret attack, often for political reasons” (Stolnici & 
Buda, 2012, p. 907). A more detailed definition is provided by The National Counterterrorism 
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Center, which defines the tactic as the “targeted killing of a country’s public officials or 
individuals who represent the political, economic, military, security, social, religious, media or 
cultural establishments. The killings can be motivated by ideology, religion, politics, or 
nationalism.”  
 This dissertation adopts the definition provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
since it uses GTD data on terrorist assassinations. The GTD defines an assassination as “an act 
whose primary objective is to kill one or more specific, prominent individuals. Usually carried 
out on persons of some note, such as high-ranking military officers, government officials, 
celebrities, etc. Not to include attacks on non-specific members of a targeted group” (National 
Consortium, 2016, p. 22). If a terrorist group seeks to target American citizens generally, rather 
than particular individuals (i.e., a prominent politician or business person), then the attack is not 
an assassination since the target is not specific enough. An assassination is considered successful 
if the intended target is killed. If an attack results in the target being injured but not killed, or in 
other individuals being killed, the GTD considers the incident unsuccessful. This definition 
highlights how the tactic of assassination is distinguished from terrorist attacks due to its unique 
target type. Assassinations target specific individuals, while other types of terrorist attacks often 
target locations, structures, or general groups or categories of people. 
Assassinations included in the GTD must also align with the GTD’s definition of 
terrorism, which is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (National Consortium, 2016, p. 8). The GTD’s inclusion criteria also require that 
two of the following criteria are satisfied: “1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal, 2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, 
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intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate 
victims, 3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities” (National 
Consortium, 2016, p. 9).  
 
History of Assassination 
Origins of Assassination  
The term “assassin” comes from a radical Muslim Shi’a terrorist group that fought the 
Christian Crusaders between 1090 and 1272 and used the assassination tactic to achieve its 
political objectives (Leiden, 1969; Hoffman, 1995). In fact, some argue that this Ismaili Shi’a 
sect were some of history’s first terrorists (Lewis, 2008). A central figure in this terrorist group 
was Hassan-I Sabbah, who exploited the psychological impact of terror by requiring his assassins 
to attack with daggers in intimate and violent clashes (Bogosian, 2015). The word “assassin” 
stems from an Arabic word meaning “hasish-eater”, which refers to the tradition of assassins 
taking hashish right before they attacked (Leiden, 1969; Hoffman, 1995). Assassins were 
motivated by the belief that the assassination was a “divine duty”, and they would go directly to 
heaven if they were killed during the attack (Hoffman, 1995). The idea of the suicide martyr that 
exists in some radical jihadist Islamist terrorist organizations today can therefore be traced back 
to these original assassins (Hoffman, 1995).  
The assassination tactic greatly benefited from technological advances in weapons 
technology during the nineteenth-century’s Industrial Revolution. These technological 
improvements ensured that attacks were more deadly and thus successful (Bogosian, 2015). The 
development of the machine gun, handgun and explosives assisted revolutionaries in their use of 
assassinations to inflict political change. These new technologies helped further the cause of the 
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Russian left-wing group known as The People’s Will when they assassinated Tsar Alexander II 
in 1881 as well as the Bolsheviks when they killed Tsar Nicholas II decades later (Bogosian, 
2015). Organized groups seeking to further some political objective increasingly relied on the 
assassination tactic in the nineteenth-century (Gross, 1969). These groups frequently directed 
terror at prominent political leaders they viewed as oppressors (Gross, 1969). In the decades 
preceding World War I, world leaders were assassinated at a rapid pace, as prime ministers, 
presidents, and kings from the United States, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Persia, France, 
Austria, Ecuador, and Austro-Hungary were killed (Bogosian, 2015). 
 
Impact of Assassination: Examples 
Terrorists frequently employ assassinations to achieve their goals, with roughly 17,000 
incidents recorded by the GTD since 1970 (National Consortium, 2015). Assassinations not only 
cause internal unrest and instability within a country, but also contribute to international 
conflicts. History is full of examples illustrating the extensive influence a successful 
assassination can have.  
One of the most prominent incidents is the 1914 assassination of the heir to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In June 2014, the Archduke planned a visit to the 
Bosnian capital of Sarajevo with his wife Sophie. Despite having received several warnings of 
the danger that existed in Sarajevo and having been urged by the Emperor and his chamberlain to 
cancel the trip, the Archduke refused to postpone the visit (Lebow, 2000). On the morning of 
June 28, the Archduke arrived in Sarajevo and was driving to the Town Hall when a Serbian 
nationalist threw a grenade at his car. The bomb missed the Archduke’s car and exploded nearby 
injuring two officers in the following car along with some bystanders (“Heir to Austria’s throne,” 
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1914). After the explosion, the Archduke insisted on continuing his visit (Lebow, 2000). During 
his return from the Town Hall, a member of the Serbian nationalist group known as the Black 
Hand, Gavrilo Princip, emerged from the crowd and fired on the Archduke and his wife in their 
vehicle, killing them instantly (Levinson, 2005; Weissman, Busch, & Schouten, 2014; Bogosian, 
2015). In the days following the attack, the impact of the event was seen in newspapers 
throughout the world. The British newspaper, The Morning Post, declared that the assassination 
of the Archduke was an act of aggression that “was to serve as a pretext for the assassination of a 
nation” (Watt, 1971, p. 246). Historians maintain that the assassination of the Archduke was the 
single event that triggered World War I, thus changing history (Lebow, 2000; Weissman et al., 
2014).   
Another example is the March 16, 1978 kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister 
Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, a left-wing terrorist organization. After abducting Moro, the 
Red Brigades declared that Moro is “Only our first victim. We shall hit at the heart of the state” 
(“Aldo Moro”, 1978). When the Italian government did not meet their demands to release 13 
extremist prisoners, the group assassinated Moro on May 9th, leaving his body in an abandoned 
car in the heart of Rome (Moss, 1981). Moro’s murder was representative of the growing 
political violence perpetrated by several Italian terrorist groups during the early 1970’s. The 
event demonstrates how terrorists use the assassination tactic to inflict symbolic and physical 
harm to achieve their objectives. Moro was a symbolic target, he led one Italy’s major parties, 
and his death severely impacted the Italian government (Gumbel, 1998).  
The 1984 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi exemplifies the 
preferences of terrorists to attack symbolic targets to convey a political message. On October 31, 
Gandhi’s two Sikh bodyguards killed her in the morning as she walked to her garden on her way 
9 
	
to work. As she passed the gate, her guards opened fire on her with a handgun and automatic 
weapon. It is largely believed that her assassination was in response to the Indian Army’s 
Operation Blue Star in June of 1984, which greatly damaged the Sikh Golden Temple (Stevens, 
1984). Although Gandhi had been under heightened security, it has been alleged that her 
secretary dismissed an order from intelligence and security officials to remove Sikh policemen, 
including the guards who eventually murdered her, as a security precaution (Hazarika, 1989). In 
the minutes following Gandhi’s assassination, soldiers killed one of the perpetrators, Beant 
Singh, while guards arrested the second perpetrator (Stevens, 1984). Gandhi not only represented 
a highly symbolic target whose assassination would have a significant impact, but she also 
represented a relatively easy target since her bodyguards had personal access to her. 
Organized criminal groups have also used the assassination tactic. This is seen in the 
mafia’s murder on May 23, 1992 of the Italian prosecutor and judge, Giovanni Falcone who was 
intimately involved in overthrowing the mafia’s power and influence in Sicily. In the months 
following Falcone’s assassination, the mafia murdered another prominent Italian judge, Paolo 
Borsellino. While the mafia is not typically considered a terrorist organization, the Falcone and 
Borsellino murders align with the GTD definition of terrorism and are therefore categorized as 
terrorist attacks in the GTD. Scholars note the historical impact of the Falcone and Borsellino 
assassinations, and credit these murders for triggering the anti-mafia movement throughout Italy 
and Europe (Fijuaut, 2012).   
The serious consequences that an assassination can inflict are illustrated by the June 1993 
murder of Melchior Ndadye, the first democratically elected president of Burundi (Appleton, 
2000). The Ndadye assassination was notable because the democratization of Burundi had been 
considered exemplary until his death (Bundervoet, 2009). In just a few months following 
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Ndadye’s election, a group of Tutsi paratroopers attempted to stage a coup by attacking his 
residence and killing him along with several ministers (Bundervoet, 2009). His murder 
ultimately sparked a civil war that lasted 13 years and resulted in over 200,000 deaths (Appleton, 
2000; Bundervoet, 2009). The civil war substantially impacted Burundi’s economy and 
infrastructure (Bundervoet, 2009).  
A more recent example of a successful assassination event is the December 12, 2016 
murder of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey, Andrey G. Karlov, by a 22-year-old off-duty police 
officer. Karlov had been speaking at an art exhibit in Ankara when the apparent ISIS 
sympathizer, who was angry over Russia’s involvement in Syria, killed him. The gunman was 
subsequently killed by Turkish Special Forces responding to the attack (Arango & Gladstone, 
2016). Immediately following this incident, many argued that the attack could weaken the 
relationship between Russia and Turkey, while others maintained that it could instead strengthen 
both countries’ determination in fighting terrorism. Turkish President Erdogan even emphasized 
that the attack was a “provocation” aimed at destroying “the normalization process of Turkey–
Russia relations” (Arango & Gladstone, 2016). U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted the 
international scope of the attack by stating that the assassination was an “assault on the right of 
all diplomats to safely and securely advance and represent their nations around the world” 
(Arango & Gladstone, 2016). The murder of Karlov is an example of how the tactic of 
assassination can be used by terrorists to inflict fear and uncertainty in an attacked country. 
These examples illustrate that successful assassination incidents can have considerable 
domestic as well as international implications (Felthous, 2014). The potential to inflict such a 
substantial impact on a country by murdering one prominent individual, as opposed to large 




Links to Terrorism 
Several similarities and differences appear to exist between the original assassins and the 
terrorists operating today. Similarities include the deliberate use of terror, the loyalty and 
dedication of the individual carrying out an attack, the notion of self-sacrifice for a higher cause, 
and the reward of ascending to heaven after death (Lewis, 2008). Another similarity between the 
medieval assassins and modern terrorists is the use of attacks to inflict psychological terror 
among victims (Bogosian, 2015). While some scholars claim that an additional similarity lies in 
how both attacks have been aimed at an external enemy (i.e., Crusaders v. Americans), others 
counter that since medieval assassins were mainly concerned with attacking Muslims, this is a 
difference and not a similarity (Lewis, 2008). Other differences between the original assassins 
and current terrorists can be seen in their victims. The medieval assassins tended to attack rulers 
and leaders that represented the existing order they sought to overthrow, and in contrast to 
modern terrorists, never attacked ordinary people (Lewis, 2008). The original assassins thus 
attacked individuals that represented the most challenging and protected targets (Lewis, 2008), 
while terrorists today often prefer to attack accessible targets (Clarke & Newman, 2006). While 
the original assassins used daggers to attack their victims (Lewis, 2008), terrorists today use less 
personal weapons that allow for distance between themselves and their victims, such as firearms 
and explosives (Bogosian, 2015).  
Although similarities have been noted between the original assassins and today’s suicide 
bombers, Lewis (2008) argues that an important difference exists between the two that has been 
blurred by twentieth-century theologians whose interpretations have influenced the suicide 
bombers operating today. This difference is that Islam has always regarded suicide as a major sin 
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and there is a distinction between involving oneself in a situation where death is inevitable “at 
the hands of an overwhelmingly strong enemy” compared to “dying by one’s own hand” (Lewis, 
2008, p. XII).  
Similarities and differences can be observed between terrorism and assassination as a 
tactic. Felthous (2014) notes the similarities in how governments respond to both terrorist and 
assassination attacks. There are also parallels regarding the impact of terrorist attacks and 
assassinations. Like other terrorist acts, assassinations can intimidate enemies and the public 
generally through media coverage (Jenkins, 1981; Wilkinson, 1997). Similar to how ideological 
and political motivations are tied to the actions of terrorist organizations, assassinations 
historically have also been driven by political factors. For example, political motivations were 
behind the murder of Julius Caesar as well as the assassinations of Japanese Prime Ministers 
Hamaguchi and Inukai prior to World War II (Crotty, 1998). Once a Prince came to power 
during the Ottoman Empire, all of his brothers and male cousins were killed to prevent them 
from threatening the throne in the future (Bogosian, 2015). Crotty's (1998) typology of U.S. 
assassinations expands upon the connection between terrorism and the tactic. One of Crotty’s 
five assassination categories includes terroristic assassination. Crotty (1998) explains that 
terroristic assassinations are used by both governments to suppress insurgents, as well as 
revolutionary and organized groups to weaken governments. Assassinations have also been used 
during warfare. The Nazis frequently employed this tactic during World War II and the Viet 
Cong used it during the Vietnam War (Crotty, 1998). 
While acknowledging that political assassination is a form of terrorism, Ben-Yehuda 
(1990) calls for studying it as a distinct empirical unit since it represents a specific form of 
violence. Importantly, assassinations can be distinguished from other forms of terrorism by their 
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targets. The target of an assassination is a specific individual, while other terrorism targets are 
not (Ben-Yehuda, 1990). Ben-Yehuda (1990) argues that this distinction between assassinations 
and terrorism tends to be overlooked by researchers and warrants further attention. This 
difference between assassinations and other forms of terrorism supports a key element of the 
SCP approach, which emphasizes the importance of crime specificity (Clarke & Newman, 2006). 
For example, preventing a rape is very different from preventing a robbery, and preventing a 
kidnapping varies from preventing a suicide bombing (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Freilich & 
Newman, 2009). Accordingly, it is important to examine specific forms of terrorism, like 
assassinations, to understand the processes that influence their occurrence and to best prevent 
and disrupt these attacks (Clarke & Newman, 2006).  
 
Current Assassination Literature 
This dissertation focuses on assassinations committed by terrorists, and excludes other 
types of assassinations. Interestingly, few studies have examined assassinations carried out by 
terrorists. In fact, attacks targeting public officials were largely absent from academic research in 
the U.S. until 1964, when the Warren Commission renewed interest in political assassination 
(Farnham & Busch, 2016). Even after 1964, the topic tended to be ignored by researchers until 
the 1980’s (Dietz & Martell, 2010). Dietz and Martell (2010) note, however, that in the period 
prior to the 1980s, the empirical studies on assassinations and the individuals who target public 
figures mainly focused on psychotic visitors to government buildings like the White House. 
Assassinations therefore represent an understudied tactic in the terrorism literature, while other 
tactics, like suicide attacks and aerial hijackings, have typically received more attention. 
Currently, the assassination literature mostly focuses on the political and cultural impact of 
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attacks on countries attacked, as well as the psychological impact on individual citizens. 
Psychologists, political scientists and historians usually conduct these assassination studies, 
while criminologists rarely engage this issue.  
Since scholars emphasize that an interdisciplinary approach is valuable in assessing the 
threat against prominent individuals (Felthous, 2016), the use of criminological theories can 
further assist researchers and practitioners in understanding this phenomenon. In addition, 
studies often examine the individual-level characteristics of assassins (i.e., psychological and 
behavioral factors) that motivated them to commit the assassination. The assassination event 
itself, importantly, is rarely the central focus, and studies usually apply qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative methods. Since criminological approaches are lacking in the literature, especially in 
the context of terrorism, an emphasis on the environmental and situational factors that facilitate 
assassinations is similarly lacking.  
Although understudied, there are a few quantitative investigations of assassination 
incidents. Nice (1994) finds that certain political conditions contribute to assassination attempts 
on U.S. presidents. The likelihood of an attack is facilitated by the advent of the modern 
presidency as a symbol of importance and power along with its increased visibility by the public 
(Nice, 1994). Periods of partisan realignments along with war are also associated with 
presidential assassination attempts. Iqbal and Zorn (2006) empirically examine assassination 
incidents of heads of state between 1946 and 2000. They look at institutional and sociopolitical 
factors and find that assassinations are related to the manner in which a leader takes and stays in 
office, the amount of power that they exert in office, and the degree of repressiveness they rule 
with (Iqbal & Zorn, 2006). Other studies analyze how lone-wolf terrorists compare to assassins 
and school attackers (McCauley, Moskalenko & Van Son, 2013; McCauley & Moskalenko, 
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2014). McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2014) study highlights the importance of both opportunity 
and means in their examination of the common characteristics of assassins and school attackers. 
They discover four main shared characteristics: grievance, depression, unfreezing (i.e., a 
personal disconnect), and weapons use outside of the military. They argue that grievance offers a 
motive for violence, while weapons experience provides the means. Lastly, depression and 
unfreezing lower the opportunity cost involved for those engaging violence. Mandala (2017) 
quantitatively analyzed terrorist assassinations and suicide attacks through the “root causes” 
framework, and finds some country-level conditions to be uniquely associated with either 
assassinations or suicide attacks, while some are associated with both attack types. 
Many researchers examine assassination case studies and find that attacks can have 
serious political ramifications for attacked countries (Crotty, 1998). The assassination of a 
government figure can disrupt and threaten democracy (Vossekuil, Borum, Fein, & Reddy, 
2001), which contributes to the impression that an attacked country is politically unstable 
(Hurwitz, 1973). One example of the political consequences resulting from an assassination is 
the murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro that ended the Historic Compromise in 
Italy, a controversial agreement that would have created a coalition between the Christian 
Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (Gumbel, 1998). In another example, Yitzhak 
(2010) discusses how the assassination of Jordan’s King Abdallah in 1951 challenged his 
nation’s stability as the leaders felt immediately threatened by the Palestinians as well as other 
Arab nations. Successful assassinations can directly influence the government’s operation. For 
instance, in the United States, the office of the presidency has been held for over 20 years by 
presidents who took office as a direct result of their predecessor’s assassination (Appleton, 
2000). Research finds that presidents who come to office following an assassination can 
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encounter unique challenges in establishing their legitimacy (Abbott, 2005). Kazemzadeh and 
Eid (2008) focus on the possible political ramifications for identifying the assassin of Lebanese 
Hezbollah Commander Imad Mughniyah. 
 In addition to an assassination’s political consequences, it can also traumatize a nation’s 
citizenry. Several researchers highlight the domestic or cultural trauma that results in an attacked 
country after an unexpected and shocking assassination. One example is the 1948 assassination 
of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, which Debs (2013) contends was responsible for producing such a 
cultural trauma. Researchers note that the assassinations of President Lincoln, President 
McKinley and President Kennedy had a traumatic impact on the population and led to the office 
of the U.S. presidency being seen by many as a sacred cultural object (Schwartz, 1991; Childers, 
2013). Similarly, Türkmen-Dervişoğlu (2013) analyzes the cultural trauma provoked in Turkey 
following the 2007 assassination of the well-known Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. 
 Scholars note how political assassinations often evoke many different emotional 
responses among citizens who feel threatened by the attack (Varma, Chandiramani, Rao, Bhave, 
& Kaur, 1989). President Kennedy’s assassination, for example, had a deep psychological impact 
on American citizens (Ebel-Lam, Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Jones, 2010). Freedman (1984) finds 
that many Americans identified the assassination of President Kennedy as the equivalent of their 
own father being murdered. In fact, many Americans were actually more depressed following the 
president’s murder than they were when their own father died. Similarly, researchers have noted 
the traumatizing impact that the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had 
on the Israeli population (Klingman, 2001; Zelig & Nachson, 2012). Assassinations of important 
political figures can also leave a lasting impression on citizens’ memories (Appleton, 2000; Zelig 
& Nachson, 2012). One study finds that the 1994 assassination of Mexican presidential candidate 
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Luis Donaldo Colosio caused acute stress reactions among citizens (Maldonado et al., 2002). 
Results further indicate that individuals do not need to be physically present to experience the 
psychological effects of an assassination (i.e., they can watch the attack on television). More 
recently, researchers contend that the June 16, 2016 attack on British Labour Party politician Jo 
Cox was seen by many as a “catastrophic shock and horrific loss” for not only the UK, but also 
for the world (Felthous, 2016, p. 602-603).  
Many studies focus on the individuals responsible for threatening or carrying out an 
attack on a public official. In response to the threat posed to public figures, various threat 
assessment units have been formed throughout the world to detect and respond to alarming 
behavior (Guldimann, Brunner, Schmid, & Habermeyer, 2016). James and Farnham (2016) 
explain that these groups have mainly been formed as a response to the risk posed to public 
officials by lone actors. In the U.S., such threat assessment groups exist in the Capitol Police 
(Scalora & Zimmerman, 2015; James & Farnham, 2016), the Secret Service (Phillips, 2006; 
James and Farnham, 2016), and the LAPD Threat Assessment Unit (Scalora & Zimmerman, 
2015). The Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC) was formed to address threats in the U.K. 
(James & Farnham, 2016), and the Threat Assessment Unit of the Netherlands National Police 
Agency was also formed to address threats to public officials (van der Meer, Bootsma, & Meloy, 
2012; James & Farnham, 2016). 
Scholars have investigated the role of mental illness in individual threateners and 
assassins of prominent figures. Researchers find that most assassins of U.S. government officials 
were mentally ill (Meloy et al., 2004). For example, President Reagan’s and President Clinton’s 
attempted assassins both suffered from emotional and mental deficits (Clarke & Lucente, 2003; 
Goldstein, 1981; Rosenzweig, 1981). Logan et al. (1984) stress the role of mental illness in their 
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analysis of U.S. presidential threateners who received court-ordered psychiatric evaluations. 
Despite the known presence of mental and emotional disorders in U.S. presidential assassins, 
Felthous (1985) finds that historically, these individuals have been punished severely. Mental 
illness has been found to be a significant factor in individuals that attack other public figures 
(Guldimann, et al., 2016). In their study of public figure attackers in the U.S., Meloy and 
Amman (2016) discover that most incidents are not politically motivated. However, the authors 
admit that it was difficult to unravel ideology and mental illness.  
Scalora and Zimmerman (2015) find that the Threat Assessment Section of the U.S. 
Capitol Police encounter a substantial number of individuals suffering from serious mental 
illness. In their analysis of individuals who inappropriately contact members of Congress in the 
U.S., Scalora et al. (2002a) note a significant presence of mentally ill individuals. However, they 
emphasize that the presence of mental illness alone is not necessarily predictive of violence. 
Instead, other variables like type of symptomatology and treatment compliance are more likely to 
predict violence. In a study that specifically examined the role of pre-contact behavior in 
individuals that inappropriately contacted members of the U.S. Congress or their staff members, 
Scalora et al. (2002b) discover that almost half of those who approached their targets had 
engaged in pre-attack contact behavior. In another study of inappropriate contacts to members of 
Congress, Schoeneman-Morris et al. (2007) specifically compare letter vs. email writers. The 
authors find that letter writers are more likely than email writers to show signs of mental illness 
and thus appear to pose a greater threat. Calhoun (2001) analyzes violence committed against 
judicial officials in the U.S., and explains how this violence is distinguishable from violence 
against other public officials. Calhoun (2001) concludes that individuals who threaten judges are 
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different because they do not seek infamy from killing the official. Instead, they attack out of 
anger or revenge against the system that the official personifies. 
The lack of political motivation that characterizes U.S. presidential assassins 
distinguishes the U.S. from other developed countries where assassins instead tend to be 
politically driven (Heyman, 1984; Crotty, 1998; Clarke & Lucente, 2003; Felthous, 2016). The 
fact that relatively few assassinations motivated by terrorism have occurred in the U.S. may also 
contribute to the scant literature focusing on terrorist assassinations. Fein and Vossekuil (1999) 
explain that the traditional goal of an assassination on a national leader is to eliminate the 
individual and/or place a different individual into that position of power to essentially change 
who controls the government. The authors contend that in a constitutional democracy like the 
U.S., however, an assassination of a national leader will not achieve this political goal.  
Clarke and Lucente (2003) discuss the typology used by the U.S. Secret Service to 
classify presidential assassins. Only one of this typology’s four categories (Type I) accounts for 
political extremist motivations while the remaining three categories (Type II, III, and IV) 
account for varying degrees of emotional and mental disorders. Using a clinical context, Phillips 
(2006) expands the U.S. Secret Service classification to five categories to describe the 
motivations of presidential stalkers and assassins. These categories include: resentful, 
pathologically obsessed, infamy seeking, intimacy seeking, and nuisance or attention seeking. 
Here too none of Phillips’ (2006) categories account for political motivations.   
 Even though pathological motivations behind U.S. political assassins tend to be unique to 
the U.S., emotionally disturbed individuals have carried out assassinations in other countries. For 
example, the assassin responsible for murdering Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna 
Lindh in 2003 had a history of psychological disorders (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011). Van der 
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Meer et al. (2012) analyze the individuals referred to the Threat Assessment Unit in the 
Netherlands for engaging in problematic approaches or communications with the Dutch Royal 
Family. They find that the majority of subjects were mentally ill. Pathé, Lowry, Haworth, 
Winterbourne, and Day (2016) examine individuals referred to a fixated threat assessment center 
in Queensland, Australia and discover that almost half of the cases involved seriously mentally 
ill individuals. Importantly, the authors conclude that it is important to provide mental health 
care to such individuals to prevent future problematic behavior. In fact, more than 75% of the 
mentally ill individuals did not receive mental health care. In their study of individuals who have 
shown abnormal attentions toward the British Royal Family, Darnley et al. (2010) find that 
individuals who approach, compared to those who only communicate, with their targets are more 
likely to have a serious mental illness. Lone-actors, individuals not affiliated with an organized 
terrorist group, often play a role in assassinations and attacks on public officials (Farnham & 
Busch, 2016). While studies typically conclude that members of terrorist groups usually are not 
mentally ill, lone-actors are significantly more likely to have a mental illness (Corner & Gill, 
2015; Farnham & Busch, 2016; Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). Similar to U.S. 
presidential assassins, lone-actor terrorists are also more likely to be socially isolated (Corner & 
Gill, 2015). One analysis of lone-wolf attacks suggests that lone actors are less successful than 
organized terrorist groups (Jasparro, 2010). Another study shows that the success of lone actors 
is highly dependent on the opportunities present and their ability to adapt to changing 
surroundings (Gill & Corner, 2016). 
 In sum, a criminological perspective is rarely used to study assassination as a terrorist 
tactic. The current literature also lacks a focus on the assassination event itself, instead 
concentrating on the political conditions surrounding an attack or resulting from it. The literature 
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also concentrates on the psychological impact attacks can have on citizens, along with the mental 
and emotional characteristics of individual assassins and those who threaten public figures. 
Research has yet to quantitatively examine the environmental conditions and situational 
opportunities that facilitate successful assassination events. To fill this gap, this dissertation 
applies criminological opportunity theories (i.e., rational choice, routine activities, and crime 
pattern) that emphasize the crime event, rather than the individual offender, to study terrorist 
assassinations.  
 
CH. 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There is a growing body of research applying a criminological lens to terrorism, 
especially through the framework of environmental criminology and SCP (LaFree & Freilich, 
2016). LaFree and Hendrickson (2007) explain that although criminologists have been slow to 
study terrorism, a criminological approach can greatly benefit the fight against terrorism by 
assisting our understanding of terrorist behavior and the practices for processing terrorists. The 
authors highlight that crime and terrorism are often connected since many terrorists must engage 
in crime to further their objectives (see also Hamm, 2007).  
 
Environmental Criminology & SCP: 
Environmental criminology stresses the importance of the crime event and examining the 
opportunities that facilitate the crime to occur. In comparison, traditional criminology theories 
tend to emphasize the offender and distal causes of crime (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). 
Studying the interaction between the offender and his/her environment assists in the formulation 
of effective prevention measures (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). Environmental criminology is 
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influenced by three opportunity theories: routine activities, rational choice, and crime pattern 
(Clarke, 2008). Routine activities looks at how crime occurs through the intersection in time and 
space of 1) a likely offender, 2) a suitable target, and 3) the absence of a capable guardian. It also 
takes into account handlers (of offenders) and place managers (of locations) (Cohen & Felson, 
1979; Felson & Cohen, 1980; Felson, 2008; Scott, Eck, Knutsson, & Goldstein, 2008). Rational 
choice examines how offenders make decisions, maintaining that criminal behavior is purposive, 
rational, and there are different stages of criminal involvement (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish 
& Clarke, 1987). In addition, rational choice emphasizes how the decision-making processes of 
offenders are crime-specific (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1987). Crime pattern 
theory maintains that crimes do not occur randomly, but instead unfold when there is a 
convergence of both the offender and victim’s environment. In addition, the theory maintains 
that crime is concentrated in hot spot areas with crime attractors and crime generators present 
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993). 
 SCP is influenced by all three of these crime opportunity theories (Clarke, 2008). SCP 
seeks to alter the opportunities and environment surrounding a specific criminal event to prevent 
it (Clarke, 2008). A central element of this approach is the disaggregation and analysis of 
specific forms of crime from broader crime categories. Like crime, different forms of terrorism 
must be considered separately. Suicide bombings in restaurants are very different from those 
occurring in buses and should therefore be analyzed separately (Newman & Clarke, 2007). 
Similarly, the conditions facilitating suicide bombings differ greatly from those enabling areal 
hijackings (Newman & Clarke, 2007). The importance of distinguishing between different types 
of terrorist attacks can be seen in the 9/11 Commission Report. The Commission describes how 
before the attacks on 9/11, the airlines were mainly concerned with the threats posed by areal 
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hijackings in the traditional sense and of bombs being placed in passenger luggage. The 
possibility of airplanes being used as suicide bombs was never considered, and therefore the pre-
9/11 security measures were unable to disrupt this attack type. 
 Through the focus on crime specificity, SCP seeks to inform prevention measures that 
reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the risks and difficulties for offenders as well as 
reducing their rewards (Clarke, 1995). Clarke (2008) notes that sometimes only one small 
element of a criminal opportunity needs to be eliminated for a crime to be successfully 
prevented. Thus, a focus on understanding the steps and processes behind how a criminal event 
takes place helps inform prevention measures (Clarke, 2008). Cornish’s (1994) crime scripts 
argues that the crime commission process usually consists of several steps. Cornish (1994) 
maintains that crime scripts can be developed for various forms of crime to explain how each 
unfolds and how offenders make decisions. An understanding of how a crime unfolds helps 
develop specific interventions and crime prevention measures that can be utilized at various 
stages of the crime. 
Cornish and Clarke’s (2003) most recent formulation of SCP includes 25 techniques for 
disrupting both crime opportunities and offender motivation cues (Figure 1). They propose 5 
techniques for each of the 5 main themes of 1) Increasing the effort, 2) Increasing the risks, 3) 
Reducing the rewards, 4) Reducing provocations, and 5) Removing excuses. Examples of 
techniques that fall into the “increase the effort” concept include target hardening, while those 
directed toward “increasing the risks” include extending guardianship and strengthening formal 
surveillance (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2008). Techniques for reducing offender rewards 
include removing and concealing targets, while those directed towards reducing provocations 
include neutralizing peer pressure and avoiding disputes (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Clarke, 2008). 
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Finally, examples of techniques for removing excuses include setting rules and posting 




Terrorism & SCP  
Some argue that SCP is a more effective counterterrorism strategy compared to other 
approaches that focus on the apprehension and interrogation of terrorist suspects (Freilich & 
Newman, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2007; Felson & Clarke, 1997). In addition, SCP can be seen 
as a more ethical and efficient strategy compared to others that rely mainly on the targeting of 
terrorists through drone strikes. Several studies are beginning to apply this framework to 
terrorism to inform the development of counterterrorism interventions (Lum & Koper, 2011). 
This trend is influenced by Clarke and Newman’s (2006) book Outsmarting the Terrorists, 
Figure 1: 25 Techniques of Situational Prevention 
Source: Cornish and Clarke (2003), p. 90 
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which called for the application of SCP to terrorism by tailoring SCP’s 25 techniques to the 
terrorism context. They call this reformulation the “Four Principles of Situational Prevention and 
Four Pillars of Opportunity”. The “Four Pillars” include the following opportunities: facilitating 
conditions, targets, weapons, and tools (Clarke & Newman, 2006).  
The “Four Principles” are similar to the topics included in the 25 techniques of SCP, and 
include: increasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the rewards, and reducing 
provocations and excuses (Clarke & Newman, 2006). When targets are symbolic or easy for 
terrorists to attack, target opportunities exist (Newman & Clarke, 2010). Terrorists have weapons 
opportunities when they have experience with particular types of weapons, or when attacks 
require specific types of weapons to be successful (Newman & Clarke, 2010). Tools that enable 
attacks, like credit cards and cars, are opportunity tools, while societal environments like 
communities sympathetic to terrorists are referred to as facilitating conditions (Newman & 
Clarke, 2010). Clarke and Newman (2006) expand this framework’s application to terrorism with 
their development of the EVIL DONE acronym to identify the most vulnerable targets to a 
terrorist attack. They note that vulnerable targets are those that are Exposed, Vital, Iconic, 
Legitimate, Destructible, Occupied, Near and Easy. They also use the MURDEROUS acronym 
to describe how terrorists select weapons that are Multipurpose, Undetectable, Removable, 
Destructive, Enjoyable, Reliable, Obtainable, Uncomplicated, and Safe (Clarke & Newman, 
2006). 
Researchers have begun examining many of Clarke and Newman’s (2006) claims. Ekici, 
Ozkan, Celik, and Maxfield (2008; see also Boba, 2009) apply EVIL DONE to assess target 
attractiveness to terrorists in Turkey. Other researchers explore the effectiveness of target 
hardening measures. Silke (2010) finds such measures to be effective at preventing terrorist 
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attacks on the Olympics, but finds evidence of displacement where terrorists opt to instead attack 
close to Olympic venues rather than the main sites that are protected. In another study, Perry, 
Apel, Newman, and Clarke (2016) find that Israel’s West Bank Barrier effectively prevented 
suicide bombings and other attacks. The authors also find no evidence of displacement, but 
rather identify a diffusion of benefits effect. Specifically, fatalities and attacks were reduced in 
sections where construction of the Barrier had not begun as well as on the Palestinian side of the 
Barrier. Hsu and Apel (2015) find that the implementation of airport metal detectors prevented 
hijackings and other types of aviation attacks. They also find evidence of a diffusion of benefits 
to other types of attacks and targets. 
In addition to the recent studies by Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b) analyzing 
terrorist assassinations through environmental criminology and SCP, studies have applied these 
frameworks to a variety of terrorism types such as bioterrorism (Clark, 2009), kidnapping of 
hostages (Yun, 2009), explosive attacks on railways (Meyer, 2012), airplane hijackings (Fahey, 
LaFree, Dugan, & Piquero, 2012), and suicide bombings (Clarke & Newman, 2006). For 
example, Perry and Hasisi (2015) note that individuals who engage in jihadist suicide terrorism 
behave rationally by weighing the costs and benefits of their participation. The authors also find 
no difference between the motivations of terrorists and those of other criminals. Others have 
developed crime scripts for terrorist kidnappings (Yun, 2009), law enforcement murders by far-
right extremists (Freilich & Chermak, 2009), suicide bombings (Clarke & Newman, 2006) and 
explosive attacks (Meyer, 2012). In particular, Yun (2009) explores SCP and terrorist hostage 
taking in Afghanistan and finds that terrorists are influenced by situational factors at various 
stages of the incident.  
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Researchers are applying crime pattern theory by exploring the spatial and temporal 
patterns of terrorist attacks. Johnson and Braithwaite (2009) find that IED and non-IED attacks 
in Iraq cluster significantly in time and space. They also find that these patterns vary depending 
on the attack type, indicating that different attacks may be influenced by different terrorist 
strategies. This suggests that certain counterterrorism approaches may be more or less effective 
depending on the type of attack (Johnson & Braithwaite, 2009). Interestingly, this finding 
supports the importance of crime specificity maintained in SCP. In another SCP study on 
insurgent activity in Iraq, Townsley, Johnson, and Ratcliffe (2008) note significant spatial 
temporal clustering of IED attacks. Rossmo and Harries (2011) further find terrorist cell sites and 
targets to be significantly clustered in Turkey. In particular, they find that terrorists rationally 
choose locations for their cells that are not too far from their targets. Similarly, Berrebi and 
Lakdawalla (2007) examine the spatial and temporal variation of Israeli terrorism incidents and 
find that terrorists rationally select their targets by weighing both the costs and benefits. In a 
recent study on IED attacks in Baghdad, researchers find evidence that attacks are geographically 
clustered and are more likely to occur in areas with higher population, road density, and military 
garrisons (Braithwaite & Johnson, 2015).  
In sum, studies are increasingly utilizing an environmental criminology and SCP 
framework to examine terrorism and different forms of attacks. This dissertation therefore 
extends this literature by applying SCP and environmental criminology to study a very specific 






CH. 3: HYPOTHESES  
Klein, Gruenewald, and Smith (2016) discuss the recent effort by scholars to identify the 
characteristics associated with successful terrorist attacks. Despite this effort, they note that there 
are a limited number of studies, both inside and outside of criminology, that actually do so. This 
section builds off of the SCP and environmental criminology framework and these few studies to 
develop a series of hypotheses to identify the factors associated with successful terrorist 














As Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, terrorist efforts can be thwarted by 
implementing measures that increase the effort required to carry out an attack since terrorists are 
more likely to attack targets seen as “easy”. Examples of “easy” targets are those that are 
unsecured. In their examination of far-right terrorism incidents in the United States, Klein et al. 
(2016) find that unsecured targets are significantly more likely to be involved in successful 
attacks compared to secured targets. Similarly, in their study of eco-terrorism in the U.S. and 
target attractiveness, Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, and Klein (2015) find that eco-terrorists 
prefer targets where access is gained without permission, and targets are unprotected by security. 
Similarly, routine activities theory (Felson & Cohen, 1979) argues that crime is more likely when 
guardians are absent. These findings and arguments lead to this study’s first hypothesis that: 
Attacks where security guards are present are less likely to result in a successful assassination 
compared to attacks where no security guards are present (H1).  
 Some argue that when the risk of apprehension or identification is increased, terrorists 
may be less likely to engage in an attack (Clarke & Newman, 2006). Researchers also find that 
law enforcement intervention is responsible for explaining why terrorists are sometimes 
unsuccessful (Hamm, 2007; Klein et al., 2016; Dahl 2011). In fact, Dahl’s (2011) analysis of 
foiled terrorist plots against U.S. targets, finds that not all plots necessarily failed due to 
intelligence gathering or police investigation. Dahl (2011) instead maintains that some plots fail 
when terrorists encounter alert and responsive law enforcement or security officials through 
routine activities like traffic stops (see also Hamm, 2007). Gill and Corner (2016) further note 
that the success of lone actor terrorists is partly dependent on whether or not security disrupt 
their plots. In line with this research and the SCP technique of increasing the risks involved for 
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terrorists to be captured, it is hypothesized that: Attacks where security guards are present and 
respond are less likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks where no 
security guards are present (H2).   
As discussed, a key element to routine activities theory is that the absence of a capable 
guardian creates an opportunity for crime to occur. Parkin and Freilich (2015) operationalize this 
element of routine activities in their variable “Others Around”, which accounts for whether or 
not individuals other than the victims and terrorists are present at the attack scene. When other 
individuals are present, they are essentially public guardians that can disrupt or deter a successful 
attack. Considering this literature, it is hypothesized that: Attacks where others are present at the 
scene of the incident (i.e., individuals other than the terrorists and target) are less likely to be 
successful compared to attacks where other individuals are not present (H3).  
 
Weapons 
Terrorist incidents involving conventional weapons are also more likely to be successful 
than incidents requiring more sophisticated weapons. Klein et al. (2016) note that firearms are 
considered especially simple to use as well as lethal. This aligns with Clarke and Newman’s 
(2006) weapons opportunity pillar, along with the SCP techniques of increasing the effort and 
reducing the rewards for terrorists. If terrorists have access to uncomplicated and easy to use 
weapons, less effort is required for them to carry out a successful attack, thus increasing the 
rewards they are likely to gain. This finding also aligns with the MURDEROUS acronym for 
terrorist weapon selection, where terrorists prefer reliable, obtainable and uncomplicated 
weapons. In fact, Legault and Hendrickson (2009) argue that firearms encompass each 
MURDEROUS attribute, and that guns have historically been very popular among terrorists. In 
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addition, in their development of the weapons opportunity pillar for terrorism, Newman and 
Clarke (2010) maintain that terrorists choose their weapons depending on the type of attack they 
plan to carry out. Thus, they will choose what they view to be the most appropriate weapon to 
carry out a successful attack.  
The applicability of SCP to terrorist selection of weapons in assassinations can be seen in 
Unsgaard & Meloy's (2011) discussion of the U.S. Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study 
project that analyzed assassination attacks against U.S. public figures between 1949 and 1996. 
They find that some sort of firearm was utilized in 81% of events (Unsgaard & Meloy, 2011). In 
their study of public figure attackers in the U.S., Meloy and Amman (2016) similarly find that 
firearms are used in the majority of cases. Both Bogosian’s (2015) depiction of the new 
technologies developed during the Industrial Revolution that facilitated assassination attacks and 
Legault’s (2009) notion that assassins choose weapons that are familiar, easy to use, and efficient 
support Clarke and Newman’s (2006) arguments. Bogosian (2015) points out that the availability 
and accuracy of handguns dramatically improved during this time period and as a result assisted 
assassins by improving their likelihood of success. In further support of Clarke and Newman 
(2006), researchers find that little training or skill is required to use a firearm, and firearms are 
also inexpensive and relatively easy to acquire (Jasparro, 2010; Gill & Corner, 2016). Explosives 
are also easier to detect than firearms (Jasparro, 2010). 
Clarke and Newman (2006) highlight that suicide terrorism is more effective, i.e., deadly, 
than non-suicide terrorism. Similarly, scholars have argued that suicide terrorists are particularly 
effective in reaching their targets (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Crenshaw, 2007; Gambetta, 
2006; Hassan, 2006; Hoffman, 2003). Hard targets, like public officials are thought to be more 
difficult to reach because they are better protected than soft targets, often having armed guards 
33 
	
on duty. This could increase the likelihood that offenders will be killed compared to attackers 
striking at soft targets. These circumstances often lead attackers to choose to commit (or be 
willing to accept) a suicide attack where there is no need to plan an escape, no need to worry 
about capture and confession, and no need to devise strategies to safeguard the attacker from 
harm or death. Suicide attackers have been described as the ultimate smart bomb that is effective 
at reaching their target (Hoffman, 2003), and especially effective at penetrating hardened targets 
(Freilich, Parkin, Gruenewald, & Chermak, 2018; Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, & Smith, 2014). 
Considering this literature, the following three hypotheses are proposed: Attacks where suicide 
bombs are used, as opposed to other types of explosives, are more likely to result in a successful 
assassination (H4); Attacks where firearms are used, as opposed to explosives, are more likely to 
result in a successful assassination (H5); and Attacks where magnetic “sticky” bombs are used 
compared to other types of explosives are less likely to result in a successful assassination (H6).  
In this study, explosives refer to explosive devices other than suicide bombs and sticky 
bombs. To further clarify H6, sticky bombs are explosive devices attached either magnetically or 
with adhesive tape to vehicles, usually underneath and near the gas tank (Johnston, Vetrone, & 
Warner, 2012). They are typically detonated through the use of a cell phone and are thought to 
be especially difficult to detect due to their small size (Johnston et al., 2012; Druzin, 2012). 
While they are a type of explosive, they are thought to be more complex and difficult to build 
than more basic types of explosives like roadside bombs (Druzin, 2012). These devices are 
therefore thought to be more sophisticated and complicated to use and obtain compared to 






Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain that terrorists select targets that are not only seen as 
symbolic but that are also exposed, destructible and easy (see their EVIL DONE acronym). This 
supports the notion that government officials are less likely to be involved in successful attacks 
compared to unofficial targets unaffiliated with the government (i.e., civilians) since government 
officials are more likely to have security and guardians in place to protect themselves. While 
politicians may be at a greater risk of stalking and harassment than other individuals due to their 
public visibility (Every-Palmer, Barry-Walsh, & Pathé, 2015), targets with security are less 
likely to be “easy” to attack given their protection. Gill and Corner (2016) contend that 
government targets, like police and politicians, are more target-hardened than non-government 
targets. They find that the success of lone actor terrorists partly depends on whether or not they 
have easy access to their target (Gill & Corner, 2016). In a study of public figure attackers in the 
U.S., Meloy and Amman (2016) find that politicians are at the greatest risk for a successful 
attack, followed by athletes and judges. They further discover that government officials 
(politicians and judges) are at a lower risk of being attacked compared to all non-governmental 
targets. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: Attacks that focus on unofficial targets (i.e., 
targets not affiliated with the government, like tourists, civilians, and journalists), thought to be 
less secure and more destructible, are more likely to result in a successful assassination 
compared to official targets (like police, diplomats and military officials) (H7).  
Parkin and Freilich (2015) apply routine activities and lifestyle theories to examine the 
characteristics of victims of ideologically motivated, and non-ideologically motivated, homicides 
by far-right extremists in the U.S. They use this framework to explore the relationship between 
various variables and ideologically and non-ideologically motivated homicides (Parkin & 
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Freilich, 2015). These variables include: whether the victim was attacked at home, work, or 
while engaging in work activities, and whether the attack occurred inside or outside. They find 
that ideological victims are more likely to be killed outside during their routine activities, and 
that victims of non-ideological attacks are more likely to be attacked inside and in a home 
(Parkin & Freilich, 2015). Meloy and Allman (2016) analyze public figure attackers in the U.S. 
between 1995 and 2015 and find that most attack locations depend on situational factors. Attacks 
tend to occur at places where “a reasonable person” can expect to find the target (p. 635). In 
particular, they find that politicians and judges are mostly attacked at work, while popular culture 
figures are attacked at home.  
Given these results and the SCP literature, this study proposes that assassination targets 
are more likely to have security in place at their homes and places of work compared to when 
they are outside. In addition, it is proposed that when targets are located inside buildings or other 
structures, more effort is required for terrorists to reach them compared to if the target is outside. 
It is also proposed that a motor vehicle offers a form of protection that will safeguard a target if 
attacked. The motor vehicle can not only assist a target in evading and escaping an attack, but the 
vehicle itself can protect the target from an explosion or armed assault, especially if it has 
additional protection measures in place like bullet-resistant glass and reinforced doors. In line 
with these findings and the routine activities literature, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Attacks that occur inside a building or structure are less likely to be successful than attacks that 
occur outside of physical buildings or structures (H8); Attacks that occur at the target’s place of 
work are less likely to be successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or 
structures (H9); Attacks that occur at the target’s home are less likely to be successful than those 
that occur outside of physical buildings or structures (H10), and Attacks that occur while the 
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target is in a motor vehicle or motorcycle are less likely to be successful than attacks where the 
target is outside of a physical building or structure (H11).  
Related to H11, there are additional protection measures that can be implemented during 
motor vehicle travel to help prevent against successful attacks, such as the utilization of a 
motorcade. Thus, it is hypothesized that Attacks that occur while the target is traveling in a 
motorcade are less likely to be successful than attacks were there is no motorcade involved 
(H12). The idea is that a motorcade provides the target with extra protection. A motorcade is 
operationalized as including more than one vehicle present to confuse potential attackers as to 
the exact automobile their target is in. Motorcades also usually have security personnel, i.e., 
guardians, present. This strategy is often seen when high-ranking government officials, such as 
prime ministers and presidents, travel by motor vehicle. Thus, in line with SCP, a motorcade 
increases the effort required by terrorists to correctly identify the vehicle their target is in during 
an attack. It also increases the risks involved for terrorists, as there are capable guardians present, 
thus making fewer opportunities present for terrorists to successfully attack the target.   
 
Terrorists 
Again, Clarke and Newman’s (2006) Four Pillars of Opportunity include tools like credit 
cards and motor vehicles. These tools are everyday items that assist terrorists in planning and 
carrying out attacks. Since motor vehicles and motorcycles are examples of tools frequently used 
by terrorists, it is hypothesized that Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a motor vehicle, 
or while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in successful assassinations compared to 
incidents where terrorists attack while outside (i.e., outside a building or structure; not in a 
motorcade) (H13). The argument is that the motor vehicle or motorcycle serves as a tool for 
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terrorists to not only approach their target, but to also increase their likelihood of escaping 
capture compared to if they did not use a vehicle. The fact that automobiles and motorcycles are 
used by terrorists during attacks also illustrates how the use of a motorcade, described above, can 
protect a target. Similar to how a building or structure can provide extra protection to a target, 
buildings can also guard and shield terrorists during an assassination. This leads to the next 
hypothesis: Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or structure are more likely 
to result in a successful assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside 
a physical building or structure (H14). 
 
Attack Intensity 
In an analysis of terrorist hostage-taking events, researchers find that the number of 
fatalities occurring during an attack strongly predict whether or not an attack is successful (Klein 
et al., 2016; Sandler & Scott, 1987). Other researchers note that attacks tend to occur in areas 
with a high population density, since they facilitate an attack’s success by providing both more 
people and target opportunities (Medina, Siebeneck, & Hepner, 2011; Braithwaite & Johnson, 
2015). Clarke and Newman (2006) also note that terrorists usually seek to obtain high casualties 
in attacks by attacking occupied targets. In accordance with this literature, along with the 
definition of a successful assassination provided by the GTD, where at least one individual must 
be killed in an attack, the following hypothesis is proposed: Attacks that produce greater harm, 
in terms of fatalities and injuries, are more likely to result in a successful assassination than 
those that cause fewer fatalities and injuries (H15). 
As noted, an assassination is only successful if the intended target is killed. Thus, if 
several bystanders are killed but the target survives, the assassination is unsuccessful. Since the 
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goal of an assassination is to murder a specific individual (or a few specified individuals) as 
opposed to attacks that target general categories and large numbers of individuals, it is important 
to examine the collateral damage that occurs during an assassination. Given the goal of an 
assassination, perhaps terrorists only intend to kill the target and do not aim to murder additional 
individuals. On the other hand, it could be that more collateral deaths occur during successful 
assassinations because terrorists seek to eliminate potential guardians that may come between 
them and their target. Similarly, the terrorists may employ added firepower and purposefully 
seek to kill everybody in the immediate vicinity to insure that they claim their intended target. It 
is therefore hypothesized that Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than the 
intended target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a successful assassination 
compared to attacks that produce fewer collateral deaths (H16). 
 
Distance 
Some researchers explore the relationship between distance and attack success. For 
example, Klein et al. (2016) find that as far-rightists live closer in proximity to their target’s 
location, successful incidents are more likely. Other studies note that terrorists behave rationally 
in choosing targets that are within an adequate distance from their cells (Rossmo & Harries, 
2011). In their analysis of American terrorists, Cothren, Smith, and Roberts (2008) find that 
roughly half reside and plan for their attacks within 30 miles of their place of residence. LaFree, 
Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) also highlight how important proximity is for terrorists when they 
choose their targets. In fact, Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain that target proximity is the 
most important element of EVIL DONE. Meloy and Amman (2016) also explore the role of 
distance in attacks on public figures in the U.S. They find that most of these attacks are direct 
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and interpersonal (i.e., shootings, stabbings, etc.), while indirect attacks taking place at a greater 
distance (i.e., IED attacks) occur less often. Inspired by these findings, it is hypothesized that: 
Attacks where terrorists in close proximity (i.e., point-blank range) to their targets are more 
likely to be successful than attacks where they are not in close proximity (H17). 
  
Control Variables 
In addition to these 17 hypotheses, 6 control variables are incorporated into this 
dissertation’s analyses. Similar to research on crime concentration and day of the week, research 
explores the relationship between terrorism events and the day of the week that they take place 
(Parkin & Freilich, 2015). Fahey, LaFree, Dugan, and Piquero (2012) hypothesize that since 
recreation travel is heaviest during summer months, attacks that occur during the summer will 
generate more publicity than attacks that occur during other seasons. Fahey et al. (2012) also 
hypothesize that because capital cities symbolically represent their nations, hijacked flights 
leaving capital cities will generate more publicity and thus be related to terrorism. They find that 
flights originating from a capital city are two and a half times more likely to be hijacked for 
terrorist than non-terrorist purposes. Considering this literature and how terrorists seek publicity 
(Clarke & Newman, 2006), the following control variables are incorporated: day of the week, 
season2 and capital city. These variables are also related to the SCP technique of reducing 
rewards. Two other control variables examine whether multiple terrorists were present during an 
attack and time of day (see Shane & Magnuson, 2014). The final control variable is the year of 
attack.    
 
																																																						
2 This study does not account for regional differences regarding season. Thus, “summer” represents the months 
traditionally thought of as summer in the Northern Hemisphere: June, July, and August, even though these months 
are considered winter for countries in the Southern Hemisphere. 
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CH. 4: DATA 
 
Data Background 
As noted, criminology has been slow to embrace the study of terrorism. This is partly due 
to challenges regarding defining and measuring terrorism. Scholars have noted how the study of 
terrorism has historically neglected empirical data and statistical analyses (LaFree et al., 2015). It 
is particularly challenging to measure terrorism since traditional data collection methods like 
victimization surveys, self-report data, and official data can be difficult to acquire and each 
possesses unique limitations and biases (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; LaFree et al., 2015). Scholars 
also note the difficulty and impracticality of gaining data through interviewing terrorism suspects 
and victims, especially given the rarity of such events (Freilich & LaFree, 2016). Considering the 
fact that assassinations are rarer than other types of terrorist attacks, these same data challenges 
are magnified for criminologists seeking to study assassinations. In response to these data 
challenges, researchers rely on open-source terrorism event databases like the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) (LaFree et al., 2015). Open source event databases have enabled researchers to 
increasingly apply theories of criminology, like environmental criminology and SCP, to the 
study of terrorism (Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & Parkin, 2015; LaFree & Bersani, 
2014).  
The GTD is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD is a freely available 
terrorism resource and is updated every year, recording information for every known 
international and domestic terrorist attack since 1970 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree et al., 
2015). According to LaFree et al. (2015), the GTD is the most extensive unclassified data source 
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on terrorism currently in existence and unlike most other databases, also includes domestic 
attacks. Data for the GTD are obtained from open source media outlets, and the dataset contains 
close to 120 variables with information regarding the location of an attack, the weapons used in 
an attack, the target types, the name of the terrorist group responsible, and the total number of 
fatalities and injuries resulting from an attack (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). It also codes for different 
attack types (like assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, etc.). This allows researchers to filter the 
database to focus on specific types of attacks, like assassinations. When filtered to include only 
assassination attacks, the GTD contains almost 17,000 incidents since 1970. Once an incident is 
determined to align with the GTD’s terrorism definition, it must next satisfy its assassination 
definition to be coded as such. The GTD’s assassination definition requires that the target be a 
specific individual, as opposed to broad categories of people (i.e., Americans). If the goal of an 
attack is to murder a prominent politician, but the strike fails to kill the named individual (even if 
others are killed) it is coded as an unsuccessful assassination. The same holds true if the intended 
target is injured but not killed.  
Given the number of different variables and assassination events included in the GTD, 
the dataset appears promising for assassination research. However, the dataset does contain some 
limitations. Since the data is obtained from publicly available media sources, it is biased towards 
those incidents of terrorism that are reported. Thus, attacks that occur in parts of the world with 
less media attention (such as North Korea) are less likely to be included (LaFree & Dugan, 
2007). However, it can be argued that since assassinations often target prominent and well-
known individuals, they are more likely to gain media attention and thus be included in the GTD.  
The GTD has received criticism for defining successful terrorist attacks too broadly. It is worth 
noting though, that of all the tactics coded in the GTD, assassination is one of the most 
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conservatively coded tactics in terms of success. The definition requires that a specific individual 
must die for the attack to be classified as successful. 
One potential issue is that the GTD not only codes for the primary (i.e., main) attack type, 
but also for secondary and tertiary attack types. This means that an assassination can be paired 
with other attack types such as bombings or kidnappings. However, a preliminary analysis of the 
data reveals that out of almost 17,000 assassinations between 1970 and 2014, only 169 are 
considered secondary attack types, while only 4 are coded as tertiary attacks. Since the definition 
of a successful attack in the GTD is tied to the primary attack type, including secondary and 
tertiary assassinations in the final sampling pool means that if any such cases are selected in the 
random sample, then they would need to be recoded depending on whether or not the 
assassination was successful rather than referring to the success of the primary attack type (like 
bombings, firearms, kidnappings). To include as many assassination events in the final sample, 
all assassinations are included in the sampling pool (primary, secondary and tertiary 
assassinations). Thus, for any selected incidents that have a different primary attack type (like a 
bombing or kidnapping) but an assassination as the secondary or tertiary attack type, the 
“success” variable for those incidents may be recoded. For example, if an incident has a primary 
attack type as a bombing which was successful but the secondary attack type of the assassination 
was unsuccessful, the “success” variable should be recoded as unsuccessful. 
Although the GTD does contain some limitations, it offers a promising starting point for 
researchers to examine terrorist assassinations. Since the GTD lacks more detailed information 
regarding assassination events, this dissertation expands upon the dataset by going back to the 
open source material and adding variables to fit the framework of environmental criminology 
and SCP. Specifically, materials from LexisNexis and Google are examined to code for SCP 
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specific variables not contained in the GTD. A random sample of 1,000 successful and 1,000 
unsuccessful assassinations from 2005-2014 was first obtained from the GTD. After this random 
sample was selected, the coding of the new variables for each incident commenced. The 
following section summarizes the new variables constructed from the SCP literature discussed 
above. 
 
Dependent Variable, Independent Variables & Control Variables 
 This dissertation’s dependent variable in the final analysis is the dichotomous variable for 
assassination “success”, where a value of 0 indicates the attack was not successful (i.e., the 
intended target was not killed), and a value of 1 indicates that the assassination was successful 
(i.e., the target was killed). The use of open source materials from LexisNexis and Google to 
code for key SCP specific variables not contained in the GTD allows for the framework to be 
better tested compared to if only GTD variables are used. As illustrated below, if this dissertation 
were limited to using GTD data alone, only 5 out of the 17 hypotheses would be tested. 
Therefore, a strength of this study is its use of open sources to create new independent variables 
allowing for the testing of an additional 12 hypotheses.  
As seen in Table 2, a total of 10 key predictor independent variables are included in the 
analysis, of which 3 are from the GTD, 1 is derived from both the GTD and open sources, and 6 
are entirely new variables. The new independent variables include the following: whether 
security was present and responded during the attack (H1 and H2) (0 = no security guards 
present, 1 = security guards present but no response, 2 = security guards present and responded), 
others around (H3) (0 = no one other than target/terrorists present, 1 = only family present, 2 = 
only bystanders present, 3 = bystanders and family present), weapon type (H4-H6) (0 = 
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explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide), 1 = firearms, 2 = sticky bombs, 3 = suicide bombs, 4 = 
more than one weapon type used, 5 = other weapon type), target location (H8-H11) (0 = target 
outside, 1 = target in motor vehicle, 2 = target on motorcycle, 3 = target inside building or 
structure that is not work/home, 4 = target at work, 5 = target at home, 6 = target at other 
location), target motorcade (H12) (0 = no motorcade, 1 = motorcade), terrorist location (H13-
H14) (0 = terrorists attacked while outside a physical building or structure, 1 = terrorists attacked 
from a motor vehicle, 2 = terrorists attacked from a motorcycle, 3 = terrorists attacked while 
inside a building/structure, 4 = terrorists attacked from elsewhere and were the terrorists in close 
proximity (i.e., point-blank range) to the target when they attacked (H17) (0 = no, 1 = yes)? A 
pretest was conducted on 200 assassination cases, and results indicate support for incorporating 
these variables (Mandala & Freilich, 2017a). In addition to the new SCP variables created from 
the open-source materials, 3 independent variables originating in the GTD will also be used. 
These include the following: target type (H7) (0 = government (diplomatic and general), 1 = 
journalists, 2 = military, 3 = police, 4 = private citizens, 5 = religious figures, 6 = terrorists and 
non-state militia, 7 = violent political parties, 8 = all others), victims struck (total fatalities and 
injuries) (H15), and total collateral deaths (other than terrorists and target) (H16). 
A total of 6 control variables are incorporated into the analysis, of which 4 are from the 
GTD and 2 are new variables created from the open source materials. Control variables 
originating from the GTD (or coded from information contained in the GTD) include the 
following: year of attack, season, day of week and whether multiple terrorists were present (0 = 
no, 1 = yes). A total of 2 control variables were created from the open source materials: time of 
day and whether the attack occurred in a capital city (0 = no, 1 = yes). These control variables 
were included based off of the prior SCP literature. For example, Shane and Magnuson (2014) 
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and Shane et al. (2015) utilize many of these control variables in their studies on SCP and 
maritime piracy. In addition, Parkin and Freilich (2015) use similar control variables in their 
routine activities theory analysis of ideological and non-ideological attacks by far-right 
extremists in the United States.  
Since this dissertation tests a large number of hypotheses and thus independent variables, 
a few variables were ultimately dropped or collapsed for containing too many missing values. 
Thus, as explained in the following sections, the final number of hypotheses and variables tested 
slightly differ from what is discussed above. To help tease out the full effect of all the variables, 
the first regression model contains only the predictor variables and no control variables. Next, a 
second model contains the control variables and the significant predictor variables. A third model 
contains all independent and control variables, regardless of their significance in the prior 
models. Finally, models containing all independent and control variables are run for each region 
to determine any potential regional differences.  
 
Table 2: Hypotheses and Corresponding Variables 
Category Hypothesis Variable 
Capable Guardians 
(official security) 
1. Attacks where security guards are present are less likely to result 
in a successful assassination compared to attacks where no security 
guards are present. 
Security Presence: 0 = no 
security guards present; 1 = 
security guards present but no 
response; 2 = security guards 
present and respond 2. Attacks where security guards are present and respond are less likely to result in a successful assassination compared to attacks 
where no security guards are present. 
Capable Guardians 
(not security) 
3. Attacks where others are present at the scene of the incident (i.e., 
individuals other than the terrorists and target) are less likely to be 
successful compared to attacks where other individuals are not 
present.  
Others Around: 0 = no one 
other than 
target/terrorists/security 
present; 1 = only family 
present; 2 = only bystanders 
present; 3 = bystanders and 
family present. 
Weapons 
4. Attacks where suicide bombs are used, as opposed to other types 
of explosives, are more likely to result in a successful assassination. Weapon Type: 0 = explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide); 1 
= firearms; 2 = sticky bombs; 3 
= suicide bombs; 4 = more than 
one weapon type used; 5 = 
other weapon type 
5. Attacks where firearms are used, as opposed to explosives, are 
more likely to result in a successful assassination. 
6. Attacks where magnetic "sticky" bombs are used compared to 






CH. 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
This dissertation utilizes a random sample from the GTD of 1,000 successful and 1,000 
unsuccessful terrorist assassination incidents occurring between 2005 and 2014. As the study by 
Targets (type) 
7. Attacks that focus on unofficial targets (i.e., targets not affiliated 
with the government, like tourists, civilians, and journalists), thought 
to be less secure and more destructible, are more likely to result in a 
successful assassination compared to official targets (like police, 
diplomats and military officials). 
Target Type: 0 = government 
(diplomatic and general) 1 = 
journalists; 2 = military; 3 = 
police; 4 = private citizens; 5 = 
religious figures; 6 = terrorists 
and non-state militia; 7 = violent 
political parties; 8 = other 
(airports, business, education, 
NGO, transportation) 
Targets (location) 
8. Attacks that occur inside a building or structure are less likely to be 
successful than attacks that occur outside of physical buildings or 
structures. 
Target Location: 0 = target 
outside; 1 = target in motor 
vehicle; 2 = target on 
motorcycle; 3 = target inside 
building or structure that is not 
work/home; 4 = target at work; 
5 = target at home 
9. Attacks that occur at the target's place of work are less likely to be 
successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings or 
structures. 
10. Attacks that occur at the target's home are less likely to be 
successful than those that occur outside of physical buildings/ or 
structures. 
11. Attacks that occur while the target is in a motor vehicle or 
motorcycle are less likely to be successful than assassinations where 
the target is outside of a physical building or structure.  
Targets 
(protection) 
12. Attacks that occur while the target is traveling in a motorcade are 
less likely to be successful than assassinations where there is no 
motorcade involved 
Target Motorcade: 0 = no 
motorcade; 1 = motorcade 
Terrorists 
(location) 
13. Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a motor vehicle, or 
while riding a motorcycle, are more likely to result in a successful 
assassination compared to incidents where terrorists attack from 
outside (i.e., outside a building or structure, not in a motor vehicle). 
Terrorists Location: 0 = 
terrorists attack while outside a 
physical building or structure; 1 
= terrorists attack from a motor 
vehicle; 2 = terrorists attack 
from a motorcycle; 3 = terrorists 
attack while inside a 
building/structure 
14. Incidents where terrorists attack from inside a building or 
structure are less likely to result in a successful assassination 
compared to incidents where terrorists attack from outside a building 
or structure. 
Attack Intensity 
15. Attacks that produce greater harm, in terms of fatalities and 
injuries, are more likely to result in a successful assassination than 
those that cause fewer fatalities and injuries. 
Victims struck (total deaths and 
injuries) 
16. Attacks that produce more collateral deaths (deaths other than 
the intended target/s and the terrorists) are more likely to result in a 
successful assassination compared to attacks that produce fewer 
collateral deaths. 
Collateral: Number of collateral 
deaths (deaths other than 
target/terrorists) 
Distance 
17. Attacks where terrorists are located in close proximity (i.e., point-
blank range) to their targets are more likely to be successful than 
attacks where they are not in close proximity. 
Target Proximity: 0 = terrorists 
not in close proximity to target; 
1 = terrorists are in close 
proximity to target 
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Mandala and Freilich (2017a) demonstrates, the time period of 2005-2014 was selected because 
more open source materials are available for these years compared to prior years. The time 
period ends in 2014, rather than a more recent year, to account for the possibility of more 
information becoming available or being released for some incidents after 2014. Lastly, the time 
period begins in 2005, after 9/11 and the start of the Iraq war, to control for the geopolitical 
realities that did not exist prior to 2005. Once the sample (n = 2,000) was obtained, open source 
materials from LexisNexis and Google were consulted for every incident. This enabled the 
creation of additional SCP specific variables, and thus the theoretical framework could be fully 
tested in the final analyses. The GTD cites up to 3 news sources per incident, sometimes even 
containing the original URL. These news sources cited in the GTD were first searched using 
LexisNexis and Google. If they could not be found, then additional sources were sought using 
these search engines. The search criteria for each attack included key terms related to the 
incident, such as the city or the name of the target or terrorist group involved. The GTD also 
contains a narrative variable for every incident, usually summarizing what occurred during the 
attack in a few sentences. In the event that no news sources could be found for an incident, then 
the narrative for that case was consulted to code for the new variables.  
This dissertation’s process of searching for and selecting the media reports for the 
assassinations it analyzed largely mirrored the methodology outlined in the GTD Codebook 
(National Consortium, 2016). As noted in the GTD Codebook, there is considerable variability 
regarding the availability and quality of open source materials. In fact, the quality and quantity of 
information often varies based on the time and geographic location of the attack (National 
Consortium, 2016). As a result of this variation in the quality of the open source documents, the 
GTD coding team developed a methodology for assessing the quality of sources that was 
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similarly followed in this study. Information provided by high-quality sources was prioritized 
over information from less reliable sources. As discussed in the GTD Codebook, sources are 
classified as high quality if they are independent (i.e., not influenced by the government or other 
entities) and continually report verifiable information, as well as those that are primary instead of 
secondary sources. In fact, an incident can only be included in the GTD if it has been 
documented by at least one source deemed to be high quality. Those incidents that are reported 
by biased sources are therefore excluded from the GTD, although the Codebook notes that some 
information from these sources may be used, such as information related to the attack motive.  
With regards to the search engines utilized for obtaining the media reports, Google was 
primarily used when the original sources cited by the GTD could not be located in LexisNexis, 
or when no reports on a particular incident could be found in LexisNexis. Thus, Google was used 
less often than LexisNexis. LexisNexis is particularly relevant for obtaining the open sources for 
this study, as it includes reports from media outlets originating in hundreds of countries around 
the world. It thus provides a large number of high quality, as well as low quality, sources. 
Importantly, LexisNexis is suitable for this study because it automatically provides English-
language translations for articles originating in other languages. Sources were therefore not 
limited to those outlets that were large or national in scale, as sources from smaller-scale media 
outlets were also provided. Examples of some of this study’s media sources include: the New 
York Times, Agence-France Presse, Xinhua General News Service, BBC News, Reuters, the 
Associated Press, United News of Bangladesh, the Guardian, the Business Recorder, the Daily 
Trust, the Afghan Islamic Press, the Hindustan Times, and the Daily Times. Several other 
examples of the sources consulted can be found in the GTD dataset itself (see the scite1, scite2, 
and scite3 variables) (National Consortium, 2015). 
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In addition to following the methodology outlined by the GTD to prioritize high over low 
quality sources, several steps were taken during the coding of the new SCP variables to ensure 
the quality of the data. For example, information already coded in the GTD for a particular 
incident was cross-referenced with any new source that was used to code for the SCP variables. 
Thus, if the GTD had coded the target type for a particular case as a police officer, then the new 
source was reviewed to make sure it provided consistent information. It is also important to note 
that while only one individual coded all of the new variables used in this study, steps were taken 
to ensure data quality. After the open source materials were initially reviewed for each case and 
the new variables were coded, brief summaries of each incident were created. After coding was 
completed for all the incidents, the open source materials were again reviewed for each case to 
make sure they were coded correctly. Thus, each case was coded twice using the full media 
reports that were acquired. After this second phase of coding was completed, the entire dataset 
was cross-referenced with the case summaries to further check for any coding errors. 
This study’s approach of incorporating new SCP variables is inspired by recent studies 
examining maritime piracy and SCP. In particular, scholars have examined piracy attack 
narratives published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and coded for SCP variables to 
test the influence of these variables on piracy attacks. As seen in the studies by Shane and 
Magnuson (2014) and Shane et al. (2015), this approach offers an effective and informative 
avenue to fully test the SCP framework. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) successfully utilize this 
approach in their analysis of 200 assassination cases. This dissertation therefore applies a similar 
strategy by reviewing news reports of 2,000 terrorist assassination incidents.  
It can be argued that that since assassinations represent rare events, a matched case-
control design may be well-suited for this study. Dobrin (2001) explains the main idea behind the 
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case-control design is that certain factors that could be influencing the outcome are compared 
between the case and control groups. In a matched case-control design, unsuccessful and 
successful assassination events would be matched based on certain factors that could influence 
the success of an event (such as weapon type used, target type, region or country, terrorist group 
involved, target and terrorist location during attack, protection measures in place, etc.). The goal 
is to obtain case and control groups (i.e., successful and unsuccessful assassinations) that are 
identical on a range of characteristics except for the outcome of interest (attack success).   
Goodman, Mercy, Layde, and Thacker (1988) discuss the strengths and limitations of the 
case-control design to study homicide risk factors. The authors note that the case-control design 
is especially useful for infrequent violent events like homicide. They note that the design is 
subject to issues regarding selecting cases and suitable control groups, along with information 
bias as well as issues regarding access to data. Dobrin (2001) uses a case-control design to 
compare the criminality of homicide and non-homicide victims. Individuals in the case and 
control groups were matched on demographic characteristics including race, gender and age. The 
author notes that this approach is often used in epidemiology and public health, and is similarly 
useful to study homicide (Dobrin, 2001).  
The case-control design has been successfully applied to topics outside the realm of 
traditional crime, including terrorism. For example, Smith (2004) matched 13 terrorist groups 
with non-terrorist groups based on the groups’ values. From an analysis of these groups’ 
documents, the author determined that their expressed values can determine their likelihood of 
participating in terrorism. Clarke and Rolf (2013) use a matched case-control design to examine 
the poaching of neotropical parrots. They matched parrot species to similar birds based on 
ecological factors and spatial range. The authors explain how this approach was limited by the 
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available data. For example, they could not address possible differences in the diets of the two 
groups, an important factor since diet is very much related to habitat. They also explain how they 
had to use range as a proxy for habitat since it was not possible to compare the true habitats of 
the groups with the available data.  
Researchers have noted the utility of using the case-control design for rare events like 
homicide (Goodman, 1988; Dobrin, 2001), and as Dobrin (2001) emphasizes, the approach is 
especially beneficial when there is a small sample size with known outcomes being studied.  
While terrorist assassinations represent relatively rare events, the number of total assassinations 
occurring between 2005 and 2014 is quite large (around 6,500 events). Thus, for the purpose of 
this study, there are no challenges in obtaining a large sample size of assassinations. Many of the 
studies cited above, including Smith (2004), note that a challenge in implementing the case-
control design is the selection of suitable control groups as well as limitations present in the data 
available. Since the assassination cases examined in this study are all derived from open sources 
that all vary with regards to the detail of information contained for each event, the application of 
a case-control design can be potentially problematic. By contrast, the use of a random selection 
of assassination cases avoids the challenges of selecting a suitable control group and the 
possibility of excluding important variables in the selection process. In addition, it allows for the 
use of a larger sample size compared to a case-control design since cases do not need to be 
evaluated and matched on all the selected criteria. Lastly, case-control design would be more 
time intensive than a random sample, as the open sources and the data would first need to be 





Univariate & Bivariate Statistics 
As seen in Table 1, this dissertation utilizes 10 key predictor independent variables and 6 
additional control variables, with one dependent variable (successful v. unsuccessful 
assassinations). To start, descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies and measures of central 
tendency are conducted for every variable. While most of the variables are dichotomous and 
categorical, measures of central tendency are generated for the continuous variables (total 
fatalities, total injuries, and collateral deaths). These preliminary analyses will detect if any of 
the variables contain a large number of missing cases. After the descriptive statistics are 
conducted for each variable, bivariate analyses are then run between the dependent variable 
(success) and the independent variables.  
Independent samples t-tests are run on the dependent variable and the continuous 
independent variables (victims struck and collateral deaths). Chi square tests for association with 
the Cramer’s V coefficient are run between the dependent variable and all categorical variables 
containing more than 2 categories, including: security presence, terrorist location, target location, 
were others around during the attack, target type, weapon type, day of the week, season and time 
of day. Lastly, chi square tests for association and the Phi coefficient are conducted between the 
dependent variable and all dichotomous variables, which assist in determining the relationship 
between any two variables. These variables include: capital, multiple terrorists, target proximity, 
and target motorcade. In the event that any variables are highly related, then one variable may 
need to be eliminated from the multivariate analysis since the two variables are essentially 
measuring the same concept. If some variables appear to be measuring the same construct and 
are highly related, another option is to create an index. This can be done through a principal 
component analysis (PCA), where the resulting principal component is used in the regression 
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model to represent the construct. The bivariate analyses ultimately help tease out the potential 
relationships that exist between the dependent and independent variables, and thus help inform 
the development of the final multivariate model.    
 
Multivariate Analysis 
The final multivariate analysis uses a binary logistic regression to test the influence of the 
independent variables on successful assassination incidents. Since the dependent variable 
indicating whether or not an assassination was successful is dichotomous (i.e., it has 2 levels, 
where 0 is coded for unsuccessful attacks and 1 is coded for successful attacks), a binary logistic 
regression is appropriate, as opposed to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where the 
dependent variable must be continuously measured (Menard, 2011; Maroof, 2012). The goal of 
the binary logistic regression is to determine the likelihood or odds of belonging to one of the 
dependent variable categories based on the independent variables included in the model (Maroof, 
2012). While there is no order to the dependent variable, the reference group is usually chosen to 
best assist the interpretation of the resulting coefficients (Maroof, 2012). In a binary logistic 
regression, the independent or predictor variables can be continuous and/or discrete (Maroof, 
2012). As Legault and Hendrickson (2009) point out, the use of a logistic regression allows for a 
more complete interpretation of the impact of the predictor variables on the dependent variable 
while holding all other variables constant. This means that for the purposes of this dissertation, 
the odds of an assassination being successful based on each SCP explanatory variable can be 
determined (Legault & Hendrickson, 2009).  
Scholars note that the use of a binary logistic regression is advantageous because the 
resulting coefficients are relatively easy to interpret (Legault & Hendrickson, 2009). In 
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particular, the odds ratio specifies the odds of belonging to one of the dependent variable 
categories for every one-unit change in an independent (predictor) variable, while also 
controlling for all other variables (Maroof, 2012). In addition, when the regression coefficients 
are exponentiated and transformed (by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and then multiplying the 
result by 100), the result can be more easily understood in terms of a “percent change in odds of 
the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the independent variable” (Legault & 
Hendrickson, 2009, p. 541). Another advantage is that compared to a linear regression, a logistic 
regression does not require the assumptions of linearity, normality or homoscedasticity to be met 
(Maroof, 2012). The assumption of linearity required by an OLS regression is thus avoided in the 
logistic regression by the equation being expressed in logarithmic terms (Maroof, 2012). 
Several criminology studies use a binary logistic regression to test SCP. Shane and 
Magnuson (2014) test the influence of SCP on successful maritime piracy attacks through the use 
of a binary logistic regression. Binary logistic regressions have also been used to effectively test 
the association between SCP and terrorism. In particular, Legault and Hendrickson (2009) use a 
binary logistic regression to study firearm offenses by felons and terrorists, ultimately finding 
that terrorists are more likely than felons to be convicted of firearm offenses. Fahey et al. (2015) 
apply a binary logistic regression to examine whether SCP factors can distinguish terrorist from 
non-terrorist areal hijackings. Another study utilizes a binary logistic regression to determine the 
impact of opportunity on far-right terrorist outcomes in the U.S. (Klein et al., 2016). Block 
(2016) uses a binary logistic regression to study the impact of SCP on terror attacks against 
airports and aircrafts. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilize a binary logistic regression to test the 
effect of SCP on successful assassination incidents. As illustrated by each of these studies, binary 
logistic regression is useful to analyze the influence of SCP elements on terrorist event 
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outcomes. The results of the binary logistic regression for this dissertation will therefore help 
reveal which SCP variables have an influence on successful assassination incidents.  
As noted, one model is run containing only predictor variables and no control variables, 
and another model contains all significant predictor variables and control variables. A third 
model includes all variables, regardless of significance in the prior models. This approach allows 
for the full model to be compared and contrasted to the partial models. This assists with the 
interpretation of the results as the findings may differ when control variables are or are not 
accounted for.  
To explore the cultural context behind these assassinations in more detail, additional 
models are run for different regions to assess whether there are any regional differences in the 
impact of SCP on assassination outcomes. For example, perhaps certain environmental factors in 
the Middle East enable successful assassinations; while the presence of those factors in South 
Asia instead contribute to unsuccessful assassinations. Exploring the cultural context behind 
assassinations in this manner follows the strategy implemented by Shane et al. (2015), who 
examine whether the impact of SCP on successful maritime piracy attacks are consistent across 
different continents. Terrorist assassinations may similarly differ at the regional level. While 
Shane et al. (2015) find that the disaggregated SCP techniques are effective in each continent, 
when these techniques are aggregated to indices to measure the concepts of “increased risk” and 
“increased effort”, continent-level differences are apparent for the techniques classified under the 
“increased risk” component. Specifically, “increased risk” is associated with more unsuccessful 
piracy attacks in 3 out of the 6 continents studied, but associated with fewer unsuccessful attacks 




CH. 6: RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 displays the frequency counts for all of the variables. As noted in this table, 
missing values are not a problem for the majority of the variables. The Time of Day variable has 
a substantial number of missing values (57%), and as a result, cannot be used in the multivariate 
models. Table 3 shows that all other variables have less than 30% missing values, which 
indicates that they can be used in the final models. For some of the region models, missing 
values did become an issue due to the smaller sample sizes. As detailed in the Multivariate 
Analyses section below, a few variables therefore had to be either dropped or collapsed for these 
models.  
 Table 3 shows that the sample size is 2,056, with 1,027 successful assassinations and 
1,029 unsuccessful assassinations. While the goal was to select a sample size of exactly 2,000 
cases, the random sample method utilized in SPSS returned a slightly larger sample. Initially, a 
sample of 2,000 cases was coded from this SPSS selection. However, as coding of the cases 
progressed, it was discovered that some cases were incorrectly coded in the GTD as either 
successful or unsuccessful. When such cases were discovered, they were re-coded to reflect the 
correct classification. The coding errors in the “Success” variable therefore slightly skewed the 
sample so that there was no longer an even number of successful and unsuccessful 
assassinations. To insure a relatively even number of successful and unsuccessful events, as well 
as to account for the possibility of missing cases reducing the sample size in the multivariate 
models, some of the extra cases returned by the initial SPSS sample were incorporated. As a 
result, the final sample size slightly exceeds 2,000.  
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Successful 1027 50% 
Unsuccessful 1029 50% 
No Security Present 1292 63% 
Security Present, No Response 551 27% 
Security Present and Responded 213 10% 
Others Around   
Others Not Present 1131 55% 
Only Family of Target Present 171 8% 
Only Bystanders Present 697 34% 
Family and Bystanders Present 55 3% 
Weapon Type   
Explosives 525 26% 
Firearms 1195 58% 
Sticky Bombs 81 4% 
Suicide Bombs 96 5% 
Multiple Weapons 73 4% 
Other/Unknown Weapons 86 4% 
Target Type   
Government (diplomatic/general) 931 45% 
Journalists 80 4% 
Military 165 8% 
Police 325 16% 
Private Citizens 286 14% 
Religious Figures 61 3% 
Terrorists/Non-state Militia 99 5% 
Violent Political Party 65 3% 
Other  44 2% 
Target Location*   
Outside 307 15% 
In Motor Vehicle 921 45% 
On Motorcycle 35 2% 
Inside Building or Structure 53 3% 
At Work 39 2% 
At Home 154 8% 
In Motorcade 337 16% 
Terrorist Location*   
Outside Building/Structure 1018 50% 
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In Motor Vehicle 289 14% 
On Motorcycle 227 11% 
Inside Building or Structure 168 8% 
Total Victims Struck 5552  
Total Collateral Deaths 2305  
Terrorists Attacked in Close 
Proximity to Target 427 21% 
Day of Week   
Monday 329 16% 
Tuesday 320 16% 
Wednesday 301 15% 
Thursday 280 14% 
Friday 266 13% 
Saturday 253 12% 
Sunday 307 15% 
Season   
Fall (Sept. – Nov.) 491 24% 
Winter (Dec. – Feb.) 450 22% 
Spring (March – May) 578 28% 
Summer (June – Aug.) 537 26% 
Time of Day*   
12:00 am – 05:59 am 67 3% 
06:00 am – 11:59 am 270 13% 
12:00 pm – 05:59 pm 160 8% 
06:00 – 11:59 pm 385 19% 
Year   
2005 115 6% 
2006 71 4% 
2007 83 4% 
2008 126 6% 
2009 119 6% 
2010 194 9% 
2011 212 10% 
2012 231 11% 
2013 456 22% 
2014 449 22% 
In Capital City 335 16% 
Multiple Terrorists Present 1362 66% 
Region   
Central America & Caribbean 6 0.3% 
Central Asia 5 0.2% 
Eastern Europe 62 3% 
Middle East & North Africa 856 42% 
North America 4 0.2% 
South America 20 1% 








Table 3 shows that in most cases, security was not present during the attack (63%), while about a 
third of cases had security present that did not engage the terrorists. A smaller portion of 
assassinations (10%) had security present that did engage the terrorists during the attack. In 
about half of all assassinations, there were no others present at the scene other than the target, 
terrorists, and security team. In about a third of cases, bystanders were present, while family 
members of the target were present in only 8% of cases. 
 In the majority of assassinations (58%), the terrorists used firearms as their primary 
weapon. In about a third of attacks, terrorists used explosives as their main weapon type. Sticky 
bombs were only used in 4% of attacks, while suicide attacks occurred in 5% of events. 
Interestingly, a very small percentage of incidents employed multiple weapon types (4%). 
 With regards to target characteristics, almost half of all assassination targets were 
government officials (45%). The next most frequent target type was police (16%), followed by 
private citizens (14%). Roughly half of all attacks took place when the target was inside a motor 
vehicle (45%), and 15% occurred while the target was outside a physical building or structure. In 
13% of assassination incidents, the target was inside a building or structure, at work, or at their 
residence. A large number of targets travelling in motor vehicles also were travelling as part of a 
motorcade (16%).  
Southeast Asia 210 10% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 191 9% 
Western Europe 7 0.3% 
*57% missing values for time of day; Missing values for target 
location 27%; Missing values for terrorist location 17% 
**Note: Official targets include government and diplomatic officials, 




 In half of all cases, terrorists attacked from outside a physical building or structure, 
compared to attacking from inside a building in only 8% of events. In roughly a third of 
assassinations, the terrorists attacked from either a motor vehicle (14%) or motorcycle (11%). In 
almost a quarter of attacks (21%), the terrorists were able to attack their target at a close 
proximity (i.e., within point-blank range).  
 In the selected sample, a total of 5,552 victims were struck (i.e., either killed or injured) 
in assassination attacks between 2005-2014. A total of 2,305 collateral deaths (i.e., deaths other 
than the intended target/s and terrorists) also occurred within the sample during this time period.  
 There was generally an even distribution of assassinations across the different days of the 
week. The smallest proportion of assassinations occurred on a Saturday (12%), while the largest 
percentage occurred on either a Monday (16%) or Tuesday (16%). Similarly, assassinations 
appear to be evenly distributed across seasons. The highest proportion of attacks occurred during 
the spring (28%), while the smallest percentage occurred during the winter (22%). While most 
cases did not contain information regarding the time of day that attacks took place, roughly 20% 
of assassinations occurred at night (between 6 pm and midnight), while 13% occurred in the 
morning (between 6 am and noon). Table 3 also shows the total number of attacks that occurred 
by year. Specifically, the highest proportion of assassinations occurred in 2013 (22%) and 2014 
(22%), while 2006 and 2007 experienced the smallest percentage of attacks (at 4% each). In 16% 
of cases, the attacks occurred within a capital city. In most assassinations (66%), multiple 
terrorists were present at the scene of the attack. With regards to region, the largest percentage of 
assassinations occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (42%), followed by South Asia 





 Tables 4 - 8 display the results from the bivariate tests conducted between the dependent 
variable (Success) and the various independent and control variables. Specifically, these 
bivariate tests include independent samples t-tests and cross-tabulations with chi square tests. 
The goal of these bivariate tests is to inform the multivariate models, as results from these tests 
can indicate whether any independent variables are significantly associated with the dependent 
variable.  
 Table 4 shows the results of the t-test run for attack success and collateral deaths. This 
test shows a significant relationship between the two variables t(2054) = -12.21, p < .001. On 
average, successful assassinations experienced a higher number of collateral deaths (M = 1.65, 
SD = 2) compared to unsuccessful assassinations (M = 0.60, SD = 1.9). These results are 
supportive of H16, which predicts that attacks that produce more collateral deaths are more 





 Table 5 displays the chi square results conducted between the dependent variable and the 
following variables: multiple terrorists, target in motorcade, close proximity, security present, 
and official target. A statistically significant difference exists between successful assassinations 
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and whether or not multiple terrorists were present at the attack scene, with a moderate effect 
size. The majority of incidents involving multiple terrorists were successful (62%), while most 
incidents that did not involve multiple terrorists were unsuccessful (73%).  A moderate and 
significant relationship similarly exists between the motorcade variable and the dependent 
variable. The majority of cases where the target was in a motorcade were unsuccessful (87%), 
and most cases where the target was not in a motorcade were successful (57%). This result is 
supportive of H12, which predicts that attacks that occur while the target is travelling in a 





 Table 5 shows that a weak and significant relationship exists between the proximity 
variable and the dependent variable. In support of H17, most events where the terrorists were in 
close proximity to the target resulted in a successful assassination (74%), while most cases where 
the terrorists were not in close proximity to the target were unsuccessful (56%). A moderate and 
significant association was found between attack success and the security present variable. In 
support of H1 and H2, the majority of cases where security engaged the terrorists were 
unsuccessful (84%), and most cases where security was present but did not respond were also 
successful (68%). The majority of cases where security was not present were successful (63%). 
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A significant but weak relationship was found between success and whether or not the target was 
a government official. Interestingly, the majority of attacks where the target was a government 
official were unsuccessful (74%), and most attacks where the target was not a government 
official were successful (54%). This finding supports H7, which posits that unofficial targets are 
more susceptible to successful assassinations due to lacking the security that official government 
targets tend to have in place. 
 The chi-square results between the dependent variable and the target location and terrorist 
location variables are displayed in Table 6. A moderately significant relationship exists between 
attack success and the target location variable. Most cases that occurred when the target was 
outside were successful (81%), and most cases that occurred when the target was in a motor 
vehicle were unsuccessful (64%). These findings are supportive of H11, which predicts that 
attacks that occur while the target is in a motor vehicle are less likely to be successful than 
assassinations where the target is outside. However, contrary to H11, which also predicts that 
targets riding motorcycles are less likely to be involved in successful assassinations compared to 
when they are outside, the majority of incidents where the target was riding a motorcycle were 
successful (89%). Most attacks where the target was inside, at work, or at home were successful 
(66%, 56%, and 54%, respectively). These results appear to contrast H8, H9, and H10. These 
hypotheses posit that attacks that occur when the target is inside, at work, or at home are less 
likely to be successful than attacks that occur outside. A weak and significant association was 
found between the terrorist location variable and the dependent variable. In particular, most cases 
where the terrorists were outside or in a motor vehicle were unsuccessful (63% and 59%, 
respectively). The majority of incidents where the terrorists were on a motorcycle (69%) or 
inside (69%) were successful. Interestingly, this result contrasts what was predicted by H13. H13 
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predicts that attacks where terrorists attack from a motor vehicle or motorcycle are more likely to 
be successful compared to incidents where terrorists attack form outside a building or structure. 
However, the results appear to support H14, which posits that attacks where terrorists attack 
from inside a building or structure are more likely to be successful compared to events where 




 Table 7 shows that there is a strong and statistically significant relationship between 
weapon type and attack success. In support of H5, the majority of incidents where explosives 
were used were unsuccessful (84%), while the majority of incidents where firearms were used 
were successful (68%). In support of H6, sticky bombs (65%) and suicide attacks (65%) were 
associated with unsuccessful attacks. Interestingly, attacks where multiple weapons were utilized 
were associated with unsuccessful attacks (69%). A weak and statistically significant association 
was found between the others around variable and attack success. When no one other than the 
terrorists, target, and security members were present, attacks were more likely to be successful 
(59%). Similarly, when only family members of the target were present during the attack, the 
assassination attempt was more likely to be successful (57%). When bystanders were present 
during an attack, the attack was more likely to be unsuccessful (65%). The majority of attacks 
where both family members of the target and bystanders were present were unsuccessful (56%). 
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These results are mostly supportive of H3, which predicts that attacks where others are present at 
the scene of the incident are less likely to be successful compared to attacks where other 
individuals are not present. 
 
 
 As seen in Table 8, a weak but statistically significant relationship exists between attack 
success and day of the week. Most cases that took place on a Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, and 
Friday were successful (52%, 53%, 53%, and 56%, respectively). By contrast, most cases that 
occurred on a Monday or Wednesday were unsuccessful (58% and 53%), while an even number 




 Several bivariate tests that were conducted were insignificant. Specifically, the 
independent samples t-test that was run between attack success and total victims struck (i.e., 
fatalities and injuries) was insignificant. This result is interesting considering how the t-test 
above found the variable for collateral deaths to be significantly associated with attack success. 
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For the chi-square tests, insignificant results were found between attack success and the 
following control variables: season, capital city, and time of day.  
 
Multivariate Analyses 
 This dissertation employs a series of binary logistic regressions to determine the full 
effects of the independent variables on successful assassination incidents. The dependent 
variable is the dichotomous measure of attack success (1 = successful, 0 = unsuccessful). Again, 
assassinations are considered successful only if the intended target is killed. A total of 7 binary 
logistic models are conducted. The first model contains all explanatory variables and no control 
variables. The second model contains all significant predictor variables from the first model 
along with the control variables. The third model contains all independent and control variables. 
The comparison of these first three models allows us to see how the model improves when 
additional independent and control variables are incorporated. The last four regressions are 
regional models for the following regions: the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa. These models allow us to see if there are differences 
regarding situational characteristics and successful assassinations by region. 
 A total of 10 independent variables are used in the multivariate models. The new SCP 
variables include the following: whether security was present and responded during the attack (0 
= no security guards present, 1 = security guards present but no response, 2 = security guards 
present and responded), others around (0 = no one other than target/terrorists present, 1 = only 
family present, 2 = only bystanders present, 3 = bystanders and family present), weapon type (0 
= explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide), 1 = firearms, 2 = sticky bombs, 3 = suicide bombs, 4 = 
more than one weapon type used, 5 = other weapon type), target location (0 = target outside, 1 = 
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target in motor vehicle, 2 = target on motorcycle, 3 = target inside building or structure that is 
not work/home, 4 = target at work, 5 = target at home, 6 = target at other location), target 
motorcade (0 = no motorcade, 1 = motorcade), terrorist location (0 = terrorists attacked while 
outside a physical building or structure, 1 = terrorists attacked from a motor vehicle, 2 = 
terrorists attacked from a motorcycle, 3 = terrorists attacked while inside a building/structure, 4 = 
terrorists attacked from elsewhere) and were the terrorists in close proximity (i.e., point-blank 
range) to the target when they attacked (0 = no, 1 = yes)? The 3 variables originating from the 
GTD include the following: target type (0 = government (diplomatic and general), 1 = 
journalists, 2 = military, 3 = police, 4 = private citizens, 5 = religious figures, 6 = terrorists and 
non-state militia, 7 = violent political parties, 8 = all others), victims struck (total fatalities and 
injuries), and total collateral deaths (other than terrorists and target). However, it is worth noting 
that due to the small counts contained in the categories of the target type variable, this variable 
needed to be condensed to 3 categories, where 0 = unofficial targets, 1 = official government 
targets, and 2 = other target types. 
 A total of 6 control variables are used. The control variables originating from the GTD 
include: year of attack, season, day of week, and whether multiple terrorists were present (0 = no, 
1 = yes). The 2 new control variables created from the open source materials include time of day 
and whether the attack occurred in a capital city (0 = no, 1 = yes). As described in the 
Descriptive Statistics section above, due the substantial missing values contained in the time of 
day variable (over 50%), the variable was not incorporated into the multivariate models. 
 As noted in Table 3, missing values are only an issue for the Time of Day control 
variable. All other variables do not have substantial missing values. Target location and terrorist 
location have the largest percentage of missing values (at 27% and 17%, respectively). However, 
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since these missing values do not exceed 30% for either variable, they are included in the 
multivariate models.  
  As previously noted, the binary nature of the dependent variable indicates that a binary 
logistic regression is the appropriate statistical test to use. A binary logistic regression contrasts 
from a linear regression in that the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable is not assumed to be linear. However, similar to linear regression, a logistic 
regression does have some assumptions that need to be met. A violation of these assumptions can 
result in biased coefficients and large standard errors, ultimately invalidating any statistical 
inferences (Midi, Sarkar, & Rana, 2010). In a logistic regression, the following assumptions 
should be met: no important variables are omitted, no unnecessary variables are included, errors 
are binomially distributed, the independent variables are not linear combinations of each other, 
and the observations are independent (Midi et al., 2010). The assumption that must be met in 
both linear and logistic regressions is that the independent variables should not have strong linear 
dependencies with each other (Midi et al., 2010). This is referred to as multicollinearity, where 
two or more explanatory variables are highly related or correlated (Midi et al., 2010). If 
multicollinearity exists, the resulting regression coefficients become unstable, and possibly 
contain incorrect signs or magnitudes.  
 To detect multicollinearity, Midi et al. (2010) advocate for examining the diagnostics 
produced in linear regression models. To produce these statistics, a linear regression model is 
essentially run. To run the linear regression, dichotomous variables used in the logistic 
regression need to be created for each category (except the reference) in the nominal independent 
variables. The dependent variable from the logistic regression can still be used in the linear 
model, or any other variable that is not an explanatory variable can be used as the dependent 
69 
	
variable. The choice of dependent variable is not relevant since the multicollinearity statistics are 
drawn from the predictor variables only (Midi et al., 2010). Once the linear model is conducted, 
the resulting correlation coefficient matrix can be helpful in identifying collinearity. Specifically, 
if the correlation coefficients are above 0.8 or 0.9, then multicollinearity may be an issue (Midi 
et al., 2010). Midi et al. (2010) note, however, that the correlation matrix alone is not enough to 
detect serious multicollinearity. Instead, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistic should be 
used to determine whether or not it is present. In general, if the VIF is above 10, then 
multicollinearity could pose a problem for the model (Midi et al., 2010). High standard errors 
can also be indicative of multicollinearity (Midi et al., 2010). Lastly, eigen values close to 0 
indicate possible multicollinearity, as do condition index values greater than 15 (Midi et al., 
2010). 
 To solve multicollinearity, Midi et al. (2010) maintain that in some cases, variables can 
be combined into one variable. In the event that it is not reasonable to combine variables, then 
some variables can be eliminated from the model. The potential issue with this solution is that it 
can be difficult to determine which variables to drop (Midi et al., 2010). One approach to limit 
multicollinearity is to increase the sample size. However, this is not always feasible. Midi et al. 
(2010) conclude that sometimes the solution to multicollinearity is to recognize its presence and 
understand how it may impact the results. They note that while multicollinearity does not 
substantially change the coefficient estimates, it does affect their reliability.  
 To produce the multicollinearity diagnostics, a linear regression was run using the same 
dependent and independent variables that are used in the final logistic regression models. As 
recommended by Midi et al. (2010), dummy variables were created for each category of every 
categorical variable. Tables 9-10 display the correlation matrix. As seen in this matrix, none of 
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the correlation coefficients are above 0.8 or 0.9, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
However, since the correlation matrix cannot necessarily detect serious multicollinearity, the VIF 
statistics in the resulting regression coefficient table need to be examined. As seen in Table 11, 
the VIF values are all below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. Finally, Table 
12 shows that none of the condition index values are greater than 15, further supporting the 
notion that multicollinearity is not present. Given these findings, it can be concluded that all of 





























 Partial Binary Logistic Regression Models 
 The results from the partial binary logistic model containing only the independent 
variables are displayed in Table 13. The model is significant (χ2 = 906.86, p < .001) and 
according to the Nagelkerke pseudo R2, it is a good fit (.606). A total of 8 independent variables 
are significant: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target 
motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security present. The variable with the most impact 
on the model is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 115.39). Ten hypotheses are supported, 





Table 13: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Partial 
Model (Independent Variables Only)  
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  39.78    
     Sec. No Response -.19 .86 .21 .83 ✕ 
     Security Responded -2.04 39.67 .32 .13*** ✓ 
Others Around  1.67    
     Only Family -.09 .11 .27 .91 ✕ 
     Only Bystanders -.11 .38 .18 .89 ✕ 
     Family & Bystanders -.54 1.54 .43 .59 ✕ 
Weapon Type  108.20    
     Firearms 2.08 77.93 .24 8.03*** ✓ 
     Sticky Bombs -.89 5.43 .38 .41* ✓ 
     Suicide .22 .24 .44 1.24 ✕ 
     Multiple .57 1.36 .49 1.77 ✕ 
     Other .54 1.38 .46 1.71 ✕ 
Target Type  2.33    
     Official Target -.03 .02 .18 .97 ✕ 
     Other Target Type .43 1.71 .33 1.54 ✕ 
Target Location  43.35    
     In Motor Vehicle -1.14 30.25 .21 .32*** ✓ 
     On Motorcycle .15 .06 .59 1.16 ✕ 
     Inside -.66 1.72 .50 .52 ✕ 
     Work -1.86 7.96 .66 .16** ✓ 
     Home -1.79 22.73 .38 .17*** ✓ 
Target Motorcade -1.40 22.54 .29 .25*** ✓ 
Terrorist Location  5.71    
     In Motor Vehicle .28 1.60 .22 1.32 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle .48 4.45 .23 1.62* ✓ 
     Inside  .42 .90 .44 1.52 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.15 34.01 .03 .86*** ✕ 
Collateral Deaths .86 115.39 .08 2.35*** ✓ 
Close Proximity 2.31 88.64 .25 10.02*** ✓ 
Constant -1.12 12.16 .32 .33*** ✕ 
Model χ2 = 906.86***   df = 24 
     
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 1169.71 
Nagelkerke R2 = .606 
     
 
N = 1498 [missing 558] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
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not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
 
 As predicted, successful assassinations are 10 times more likely when the terrorists are in 
close proximity to their target compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 2.31, OR = 
10.02). Surprisingly, successful assassinations are also 14% less likely when higher numbers of 
victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β = -0.15, OR = 0.86). In 
alignment with what was hypothesized, attacks are 2.35 times more likely to be successful when 
higher numbers of collateral deaths occur compared to when fewer deaths take place (β = 0.86, 
OR = 2.35). In support of what was hypothesized, successful assassinations were 1.62 times 
more likely to occur when terrorists are travelling on a motorcycle during the attack compared to 
when terrorists attack from outside a building or structure (β = 0.48, OR = 1.62). As 
hypothesized, successful assassinations are 75% less likely when a target is travelling in a 
motorcade compared to when no motorcade is involved (β = -1.40, OR = 0.25). Several 
hypotheses regarding the target’s location are supported. When the target is travelling in a motor 
vehicle, the attack is 68% less likely to be successful compared to when the target is located 
outside a physical building or structure (β = -1.14, OR = 0.32). Successful assassinations are 
84% less likely when the target is at work compared to when they are outside during an attack (β 
= -1.86, OR = 0.16). Successful attacks are 83% less likely when they occur when the target is at 
their residence compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.79, OR = 0.17). Some of the 
weapon type hypotheses are also supported in this model. Specifically, when the terrorists use 
firearms, the attack is about 8 times more likely to be successful compared to when they use 
explosives other than sticky bombs (β = 2.08, OR = 8.03). Attacks are 59% less likely to be 
successful when sticky bombs are the weapon of choice compared to when terrorists use other 
types of explosives (β = -0.89, OR = 0.41). Lastly, as predicted, assassinations are 87% less 
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likely to be successful when security responds to the terrorists compared to when security is not 
present at the scene of the attack (β = -2.04, OR = 0.13). 
The results from the second partial binary logistic model, which contains all significant 
independent variables from Table 13 along with the control variables, are shown in Table 14. 
The model is significant (χ2 = 927.06, p < .001) and the fit is strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 
0.62). The fit of this model is thus a slight improvement over the prior model. The same 8 
independent variables from the first model remain significant: close proximity, victims struck, 
collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security 
present. The variable with the most impact on the model is also still the collateral deaths variable 
(Wald = 111.94). The same ten hypotheses are supported, and the opposite of what was predicted 
was found for the victims struck variable. However, the sticky bomb variable is marginally 
significant (p < .10). Two control variables are also significant: year and day of the week 
(Tuesday).  
  
Table 14: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Partial 
Model (Significant Independent Variables + Control Variables)  
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  41.42    
     Sec. No Response -.24 1.31 .21 .79 ✕ 
     Security Responded -2.10 41.41 .33 .12*** ✓ 
Weapon Type  51.13    
     Firearms 1.85 31.11 .33 6.39*** ✓ 
     Sticky Bombs -.72 3.56 .38 .49^ ✓ 
     Suicide .25 .33 .44 1.29 ✕ 
     Multiple .32 .36 .53 1.37 ✕ 
     Other .272 .27 .53 1.31 ✕ 
Target Location  44.88    
     In Motor Vehicle -1.20 33.21 .21 .30*** ✓ 
     On Motorcycle .06 .01 .59 1.06 ✕ 
     Inside -.73 2.08 .51 .48 ✕ 
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     Work -1.94 8.74 .66 .14** ✓ 
     Home -1.79 22.46 .38 .17*** ✓ 
Target Motorcade -1.51 28.20 .28 .22*** ✓ 
Terrorist Location  7.01    
     In Motor Vehicle .28 1.49 .23 1.32 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle .58 6.11 .23 1.78* ✓ 
     Inside  .34 .59 .44 1.41 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.16 38.14 .03 .85*** ✕ 
Collateral Deaths .85 111.94 .08 2.35*** ✓ 
Close Proximity 2.29 84.95 .25 9.86*** ✓ 
Day of Week  8.32    
     Monday -.13 .25 .27 .88  
     Tuesday .55 4.22 .27 1.73*  
     Wednesday .13 .22 .27 1.14  
     Thursday .09 .10 .28 1.09  
     Friday .18 .40 .28 1.20  
     Saturday -.07 .06 .29 .93  
Season  .94    
     Winter .11 .24 .22 1.11  
     Spring .08 .13 .21 1.08  
     Summer .21 .91 .22 1.23  
Year -.12 15.49 .03 .89***  
Capital City -.14 .46 .20 .87  
Multiple Terrorists .25 .70 .30 1.28  
Constant 233.37 15.32 59.62 2E+101***  
Model χ2 = 927.06***   df = 31 
     
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 1146.77 
Nagelkerke R2 = .62 
     
 
N = 1496 [missing 560] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
 Overall, the coefficients for the significant variables appear to remain relatively similar to 
the coefficients in the first model in Table 14. In support of what was predicted, when terrorists 
are in close proximity to their targets (i.e., within point-blank range), the assassination is 9.86 
times more likely to be successful compared to when terrorists are not close to their targets (β = 
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2.29, OR = 9.86). Contrary to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 15% less likely 
to occur when higher numbers of victims are stuck (i.e., injuries and fatalities) compared to when 
lower numbers of victims are struck (β = -0.16, OR = 0.85). As predicted, successful 
assassinations are 2.35 times more likely to occur when higher numbers of collateral deaths 
occur compared to when lower numbers of collateral deaths take place (β = 0.85, OR = 2.35). 
When terrorists attack from a motorcycle, successful assassinations are 1.78 times more likely to 
occur compared to when they attack while outside a building or structure (β = 0.58, OR = 1.78). 
In support of what was hypothesized, when a target is located in a motor vehicle, an attack is 
70% less likely to take place compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.20, OR = 0.30). 
When a target is at work during an attack, the assassination is 86% less likely to occur compared 
to when a target is outside (β = -1.94, OR = 0.14). An attack is 83% less likely to occur when the 
target is at home compared to when the target is outside (β = -1.79, OR = 0.17). Successful 
assassinations are 6.39 times more likely to occur when firearms are used during an attack 
compared to explosives (β = 1.85, OR = 6.39). Although marginally significant, successful 
attacks are 51% less likely to occur when sticky bombs are used compared to other types of 
explosives (β = -0.72 OR = 0.49). As predicted, when security is present and responds to the 
terrorists, successful assassinations are 88% less likely to occur compared to when security is not 
present (β = -2.10, OR = 0.12). With regards to the control variables, successful assassinations 
are 11% less likely as the years progress (β = -0.12, OR = 0.89). Successful attacks are 1.73 






Full Binary Logistic Regression Model (All Regions) 
 The full model containing all independent and control variables is displayed in Table 15. 
The model is significant (χ2 = 932.57, p < .001) and again represents a strong fit (Nagelkerke 
pseudo R2 = 0.62). Compared to the previous two partial models, the fit of this model is 
essentially the same. Like the prior two models, the same 8 independent variables are significant: 
close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target 
location, weapon type, and security present. The variable with the most impact is still the 
collateral deaths variable (Wald = 110.49). Also, the same ten hypotheses are supported. In 
contrast to the last model and similar to the first, the sticky bomb variable is no longer 
marginally significant, at p < .05. The same two control variables are significant: year and day of 
the week (Tuesday). 
 
Table 15: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, All Regions, Full 
Model  
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  39.61    
     Sec. No Response -.24 1.27 .21 .79 ✕ 
     Security Responded -2.07 39.59 .33 .13*** ✓ 
Others Around  2.78    
     Only Family -.15 .28 .28 .86 ✕ 
     Only Bystanders -.14 .55 .19 .87 ✕ 
     Family & Bystanders -.69 2.56 .43 .50 ✕ 
Weapon Type  52.70    
     Firearms 1.90 32.28 .33 6.66*** ✓ 
     Sticky Bombs -.83 4.56 .39 .44* ✓ 
     Suicide .26 .35 .44 1.30 ✕ 
     Multiple .41 .59 .53 1.50  
     Other .30 .32 .53 1.35  
Target Type  2.54    
     Official Target -.02 .01 .19 .98 ✕ 
     Other Target Type .47 1.92 .34 1.59 ✕ 
Target Location  41.71    
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     In Motor Vehicle -1.17 30.60 .21 .31*** ✓ 
     On Motorcycle .11 .03 .60 1.11 ✕ 
     Inside -.73 2.03 .51 .48 ✕ 
     Work -1.95 8.64 .66 .14** ✓ 
     Home -1.75 20.58 .39 .17*** ✓ 
Target Motorcade -1.43 22.83 .30 .24*** ✓ 
Terrorist Location  7.47    
     In Motor Vehicle .30 1.67 .23 1.35 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle .60 6.38 .24 1.81* ✓ 
     Inside  .39 .76 .45 1.48 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.15 32.99 .03 .86*** ✕ 
Collateral Deaths .85 110.49 .08 2.33*** ✓ 
Close Proximity 2.32 86.04 .25 10.13*** ✓ 
Day of Week  8.61    
     Monday -.15 .30 .27 .86  
     Tuesday .54 4.14 .27 1.72*  
     Wednesday .14 .25 .27 1.15  
     Thursday .05 .03 .28 1.05  
     Friday .16 .30 .29 1.17  
     Saturday -.11 .14 .29 .90  
Season  1.05    
     Winter .12 .30 .22 1.13  
     Spring .09 .16 .21 1.09  
     Summer .22 1.02 .22 1.24  
Year -.12 16.52 .03 .89***  
Capital City -.12 .35 .20 .89  
Multiple Terrorists .22 .52 .30 1.24  
Constant 243.04 16.35 60.11 4E+105***  
Model χ2 = 932.57***   df = 36 
     
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 1141.26 
Nagelkerke R2 = .62 
     
 
N = 1496 [missing 560] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
 The coefficients in this model also appear to remain similar to the coefficients in the first 
two models. As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 10.13 times more likely to occur 
when terrorists are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close 
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proximity (β = 2.32, OR = 10.13). Contrary to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 
14% less likely to take place when there are high numbers of victims struck compared to when 
there are lower numbers of victims struck (β = -0.15, OR = 0.86). As predicted, successful 
attacks are 2.33 times more likely to take place when high numbers of collateral deaths occur 
compared to when low number of collateral deaths take place (β = 0.85, OR = 2.33). When 
terrorists are using a motorcycle during an attack, a successful assassination is 1.81 times more 
likely to occur compared to when terrorists attack from outside a building or structure (β = 0.60, 
OR = 1.81). In support of what was hypothesized, a successful assassination is 76% times more 
likely to take place when the target is travelling in a motorcade compared to when no motorcade 
is involved (β = -1.43, OR = 0.24). Results support the target location variables. Specifically, 
when a target is located in a motor vehicle during an attack, a successful assassination is 69% 
less likely to occur compared to if the target is outside (β = -1.17, OR = 0.31). A successful 
assassination is 86% less likely to occur when the target is at work during an attack compared to 
if they are outside (β = -1.95, OR = 0.14). A successful attack is 83% less likely to take place 
when the target is located in their residence compared to when they are outside (β = -1.75, OR = 
0.17). Results are also supportive of the weapon type hypotheses. Successful assassinations are 
6.66 times more likely to use firearms compared to explosives (β = 1.90, OR = 6.66). A 
successful attack is 56% less like to occur when a sticky bomb is used compared to other types of 
explosives (β = -0.83, OR = 0.44). As predicted, successful assassinations are 87% less likely to 
occur when security responds to the terrorists compared to when no security is present during the 
attack (β = -2.07, OR = 0.13). The same control variables from the prior partial model remain 
significant in this full model. Specifically, successful assassinations are 11% less likely every 
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additional year (β = -0.12, OR = 0.89). In addition, successful attacks are 1.72 times more likely 
to occur on a Tuesday compared to a Sunday (β = 0.54, OR = 1.72).  
 Overall, the full model containing all independent and control variables appears to be the 
best fitting model, as it explains the largest portion of the variance in successful assassinations 
(62%).  
 
Regional Binary Logistic Regression Models 
 Middle East & North Africa 
 The binary logistic regression results for the Middle East & North Africa model are seen 
in Table 16. This model is significant (χ2 = 472.49, p < .001) and the fit is very strong 
(Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.71). This model thus illustrates an improvement in fit compared to 
the previous partial and full models. Similar to the prior three models, the same 8 independent 
variables remain significant: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, 
target motorcade, target location, weapon type, and security present. However, unlike the 
previous models, an additional weapon type hypothesis is supported (suicide) along with one of 
the hypotheses for capable guardians (family & bystanders present). In addition, the terrorist 
location variable is marginally significant in this model (p < .10) when it was significant in the 
full model (p < .05). These findings suggest that there are some regional differences regarding 
the correlates of successful assassinations in the Middle East. Overall, this model shows that a 
total of 10 variables are significant, including 9 independent variables and one control variable. 
A total of 11 hypotheses are supported, and the opposite of what was predicted for one 
hypotheses was found (victims struck). Like the prior models, the variable with the most impact 
is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 61.26). In contrast to the previous models, the day of the 
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week control variable is no longer significant. However, the year control variable remains 
significant.  
 
Table 16: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Middle East & 
North Africa 
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  13.39    
     Sec. No Response -.45 1.35 .38 .64   
     Security Responded -2.89 13.09 .80 .06***   
Others Around  11.83    
     Only Family -.01 .00 .52 1.00   
     Only Bystanders -.13 .12 .37 .88   
     Family & Bystanders -5.37 11.78 1.57 .01**   
Weapon Type  22.94    
     Firearms 1.55 4.36 .74 4.71*   
     Sticky Bombs -1.69 8.81 .57 .19**    
     Suicide 2.16 5.92 .89 8.64*   
     Multiple .09 .00 1.96 1.10  
     Other .22 .03 1.25 1.25  
Target Type  1.72    
     Official Target .13 .12 .38 1.14   
     Other Target Type .75 1.59 .59 2.12   
Target Location  28.38    
     In Motor Vehicle -2.12 20.49 .47 .12***   
     Inside 2.23 2.70 1.36 9.32   
     Work -1.45 1.28 1.28 .23   
     Home -1.87 4.84 .85 .15*   
Target Motorcade -1.51 8.52 .52 .22**   
Terrorist Location  4.57    
     In Motor Vehicle .36 .97 .36 1.43   
     On Motorcycle 1.39 3.60 .73 4.01^   
     Inside  -.62 .30 1.12 .54   
Victims Struck -.21 16.73 .05 .81***   
Collateral Deaths 1.46 61.26 .19 4.31***   
Close Proximity 3.56 39.40 .57 35.26***   





     Monday -.29 .37 .48 .75  
     Tuesday .65 2.06 .46 1.92  
     Wednesday .13 .07 .48 1.14  
     Thursday .24 .21 .52 1.27  
     Friday .34 .44 .52 1.41  
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     Saturday .31 .31 .56 1.36  
Season   .32    
     Winter -.07  .03 .39 .93  
     Spring -.07 .03 .38 .93  
     Summer .12 .09 .39 1.13  
Year -.13 6.87 .05 .88**  
Capital City -.14 .21 .30 .87  
Multiple Terrorists .94 1.66 .73 2.56  
Constant 259.80 6.80 99.63 7E+112**  
Model χ2 = 472.49***   df = 35 
   
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 380.61 
Nagelkerke R2 = .71 
   
 
N = 623 [missing 233] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
In support of what was hypothesized, successful assassinations are roughly 35 times more 
likely to occur when terrorists are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are 
not in close proximity (β = 3.56, OR = 35.26). In contrast to what was hypothesized, successful 
assassinations are 19% less likely to occur when higher numbers of victims are struck compared 
to when lower numbers of victims are struck (β = -0.21, OR = 0.81). When higher numbers of 
collateral deaths occur, then attacks are about 4 times more likely to result in a successful 
assassination compared to when lower numbers of collateral deaths occur (β = 1.46, OR = 4.31). 
As hypothesized, attacks are 4 times more likely to be successful when the terrorists are on a 
motorcycle compared to if they attack from outside a building or structure (β = 1.39, OR = 4.01). 
As noted earlier, this finding is marginally significant (p < .10). As hypothesized, successful 
assassinations are 78% less likely to occur when the target is traveling in a motorcade compared 
to if no motorcade is involved (β = -1.51, OR = 0.22). Two of the hypotheses in the target 
location variables are also supported. When a target is travelling in a motor vehicle, a successful 
84 
	
assassination is 88% less likely to occur compared to if the target is outside a building or 
structure during an attack (β = -2.12, OR = 0.12). When the target is at home during an attack, an 
assassination is 85% less likely to be successful compared to if the target is outside (β = -1.87, 
OR = 0.15). Three of the weapon type hypotheses are supported. Successful assassinations are 
4.71 times more likely to occur when a firearm is used compared to an explosive (β = 1.55, OR = 
4.71). Successful attacks are 81% less like when sticky bombs are used compared to other types 
of explosives (β = -1.69, OR = 0.19). Attacks are 8.64 times more likely to be successful when 
suicide attacks are used compared to other types of explosives (β = 2.16, OR = 8.64). As 
predicted, when family of the target and bystanders are present during an attack, a successful 
assassination is 99% less likely to take place (β = -5.37, OR = 0.01). With regards to the 
significant control variable, successful assassinations are 12% less likely every additional year (β 
= -2.89, OR = 0.06). 
To summarize, the Middle East specific regression model is similar to the previous partial 
and full regressions in that it contains the same significant variables. However, it is also supports 
additional hypotheses that were not significant in the prior models (suicide, family & bystanders 
present). Lastly, unlike the prior models, the day of the week control variable is no longer 
significant. These findings illustrate the importance of disaggregating the full regression model 
into individual region models, as this approach can assist us in understanding whether there are 
regional differences in the impact of SCP on successful assassinations.    
 
South Asia 
The results for the South Asia model are displayed in Table 17. This model is significant 
(χ2 = 356.86, p < .001) and represents a strong fit (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.67). Like the 
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Middle East model, these results show an improvement in fit compared to the partial and full 
models. Due to the low counts in some of the variables, some categories had to be condensed. 
For the target location variable, the target on a motorcycle was combined with the target in motor 
vehicle variable. For the weapon type variable, sticky bombs were combined with the other 
weapon type category.  
Table 17: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, South Asia 
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  14.25    
     Sec. No Response -.16 .17 .38 .85 ✕ 
     Security Responded -2.14 14.13 .57 .12*** ✓ 
Others Around  .83    
     Only Family -.42 .53 .58 .65 ✕ 
     Only Bystanders .01 .00 .33 1.01 ✕ 
     Family & Bystanders .32 .21 .70 1.38 ✕ 
Weapon Type  25.76    
     Firearms 3.65 22.94 .76 38.64*** ✓ 
     Suicide .27 .16 .66 1.31 ✕ 
     Multiple 2.17 5.87 .90 8.74**  
     Other 1.74 4.73 .80 5.69**  
Target Type  1.46    
     Official Target -.26 .50 .37 .77 ✕ 
     Other Target Type .34 .43 .52 1.41 ✕ 
Target Location  14.40    
     In Motor Vehicle or     
     Motorcycle 
-1.45 11.51 .43 .23** ✓ 
     Inside -.99 1.46 .82 .37 ✕ 
     Work -2.42 6.04 .98 .09**  ✓ 
     Home -.97 1.70 .75 .38 ✕ 
Target Motorcade -1.66 9.16 .55 .19** ✓ 
Terrorist Location  6.18    
     In Motor Vehicle -.61 1.11 .58 .55 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle .68 3.32 .38 1.98^ ✓ 
     Inside  -.78 .94 .80 .46 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.14 23.42 .03 .87*** ✕ 
Collateral Deaths .82 38.35 .13 2.26*** ✓ 
Close Proximity 2.67 39.63 .43 14.50*** ✓ 







     Monday -.31 .39 .50 .73  
     Tuesday .70 1.98 .50 2.01  
     Wednesday -.14 .07 .53 .87  
     Thursday .52 .93 .54 1.68  
     Friday -.97 3.08 .55 .38^  
     Saturday -1.10 4.44 .52 .33*  
Season  .80    
     Winter -.04 .01 .41 .96  
     Spring -.08 .04 .39 .93  
     Summer .25 .39 .41 1.29  
Year -.19 8.12 .07 .83**  
Capital City -.00 .00 .91 1.00  
Multiple Terrorists -1.41 3.88 .72 .24*  
Constant 382.35 8.09 134.47 1E+166  
Model χ2 = 356.86***   df = 34 
    
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 345.60 
Nagelkerke R2 = .67 
    
 
N = 508 [missing 187] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or 
structure (terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target 
location); Explosives other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others 
present (others around); Security not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday 
(day of week) 
 
 
Similar to the prior three models, several independent variables remain significant: close 
proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, terrorist location, target motorcade, target location, 
weapon type, and security present. In contrast to the partial and full models, two additional 
categories in the weapon type variable are supported (multiple weapons; other weapon types) 
along with one of the hypotheses for target location (target at work). Unlike the Middle East 
model, the target home and family & bystanders present variables are not significant in this 
model. Also similar to the Middle East model, the terrorist location variable is marginally 
significant (p < .10), and the year control variable remains significant. The multiple terrorists 
present and day of the week control variables are significant. Interestingly, different days are 
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significant for this model when compared to the partial and full models. Specifically, Friday (p < 
.10) and Saturday are significant. In this model, a total of 8 hypotheses are supported, and the 
opposite of what was predicted for one hypotheses was discovered (victims struck). A total of 11 
variables are significant: 8 independent variables and 3 control variables. The variable with the 
most impact on the South Asia model is the close proximity variable (Wald = 39.63). This 
represents a departure from all of the prior models, where the collateral deaths variable had the 
largest impact. 
As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 14.5 times more likely when terrorists 
attack in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 
2.67, OR = 14.50). In contrast to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 13% less 
likely when higher numbers of victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β 
= -0.14, OR = 0.87). As predicted, when higher numbers of collateral deaths take place, a 
successful attack is 2.26 times more likely to occur compared to when lower numbers of 
collateral deaths take place (β = 0.82, OR = 2.26). In support of what was hypothesized, 
successful attacks are almost 2 times more likely to occur when the terrorist is on a motorcycle, 
as opposed to being located outside a building or structure, during an attack (β = 0.68, OR = 
1.98). Two of the target location hypotheses are supported. Successful assassinations are 77% 
less likely when the target is traveling in a motor vehicle or motorcycle compared to when they 
are outside (β = -1.45, OR = 0.23). When the target is attacked at their place of work, a 
successful assassination is 91% less likely to occur compared to when the target is outside (β = -
2.42, OR = 0.09). Three of the weapon type variables are significant. When firearms are used 
instead of explosives, successful assassinations are almost 39 times more likely to occur (β = 
3.65, OR = 38.64). When multiple weapon types are used during an attack, successful 
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assassinations are almost 9 times more likely compared to when only explosives employed (β = 
2.17, OR = 8.74). Successful attacks are 5.69 times more likely when other weapon types are 
used during an attack (this category is inclusive of sticky bombs) compared to explosives (β = 
1.74, OR = 5.69). As predicted, when security responds to the terrorists, an assassination is 88% 
less likely to take place compared to when no security is present (β = -2.14, OR = 0.12). 
Regarding the control variables, successful assassinations are 17% less likely with every 
additional year (β = -0.19, OR = 0.83). Successful assassinations are 76% less likely when 
multiple terrorists are present at the scene of the attack compared to when single terrorists are 
present (β = -1.41, OR = 0.24). When attacks occur on a Friday compared to a Sunday, an 
assassination is 62% less likely to occur (although this is marginally significant, where p < .10). 
When an assassination occurs on a Saturday compared to a Sunday, an assassination is 67% less 
likely to take place.  
 Overall, the South Asia model appears similar to the partial and full regression models, as 
it contains several of the same significant variables. However, like the Middle East model, 
additional variables are significant. Specifically, the target at work hypothesis is supported, and 
the weapon type categories for multiple weapons and other weapon types are significant. This 
model also differs from the results of the Middle East model, in that the Middle East model 
found the target home category to be significant, along with the category for family & bystanders 
present. Similar to all of the prior models, the year control variable remains significant. 
However, contrary to the other models, the multiple terrorists present control variable is also 
significant. While the partial and full models found the day of the week control variable to be 
significant, different days are significant in this model (Friday and Saturday). Interestingly, day 
of the week was not significant in the Middle East model. Like the Middle East model, these 
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results indicate that a regional analysis is valuable to determining the effects of SCP on 
successful assassinations. 
 
 Southeast Asia 
 Results for the Southeast Asia model are shown in Table 18. This model is significant (χ2 
= 109.098, p < .001) and the fit is very strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.72). This model 
represents an improved fit compared to the partial and full models. Similar to the South Asia 
model, low counts were found for some of the variables and/or categories, and as a result, some 
had to be condensed to run the model. Specifically, the target inside and target work categories 
were combined with the target home variable, so target inside is inclusive of work and home. For 
the weapon type variable, cases with multiple weapon types were recoded to whatever weapon 
was noted as the primary weapon. In addition, other weapon types were coded as missing since 
there were so few cases where other weapon types were used.  
  
 
Table 18: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Southeast Asia 
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  4.08    
     Sec. No Response -2.56 4.07 1.27 .08* ✓ 
     Security Responded -1.02 .53 1.41 .36 ✕ 
Others Around  2.94    
     Only Family -1.28 1.97 .91 .28 ✕ 
     Only Bystanders -.94 1.13 .89 .39 ✕ 
     Family & Bystanders -2.08 1.58 1.66 .13 ✕ 
Firearms 3.20 3.86 1.63 24.48* ✓ 
Official Target -1.48 2.49 .93 .23 ✕ 
Target Location  1.99    
     In Motor Vehicle -.38 .15 .96 .69 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle -.13 .02 1.08 .87 ✕ 
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     Inside -1.70 1.94 1.22 .18 ✕ 
Target Motorcade .12 .01 1.61 1.13 ✕ 
Terrorist Location  2.25    
     In Motor Vehicle -1.50 1.21 1.36 .22 ✕ 
     On Motorcycle .59 .59 .77 1.81 ✕ 
     Inside  .47 .06 1.86 1.60 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.37 2.38 .24 .69 ✕ 
Collateral Deaths 2.16 12.69 .61 8.67*** ✓ 
Close Proximity 4.29 8.65 1.46 72.70** ✓ 





     Monday -.14 .01 1.30 .87  
     Tuesday -.51 .15 1.33 .60  
     Wednesday .15 .01 1.37 1.16  
     Thursday .78 .39 1.26 2.19  
     Friday 1.22 .79 1.37 3.37  
     Saturday .23 .03 1.36 1.26  
Season  2.75    
     Winter -.39 .18 .93 .68  
     Spring 1.15 1.42 .96 3.15  
     Summer .43 .19 .99 1.54  
Year -.28 3.16 .16 .76^  
Capital City .18 .01 1.91 1.20  
Multiple Terrorists .08 .01 1.00 1.08  
Constant 552.25 3.15 311.19 7E+239^  
Model χ2 = 109.908***   df = 29 
     
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 81.113 
Nagelkerke R2 = .724 
     
 
N = 147 [missing 63] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
 Several similar independent variables remain significant in this model when compared to 
the prior models: close proximity, collateral deaths, weapon type, and security present. In 
contrast to the other models, the following variables are no longer significant: victims struck, 
terrorist location, target motorcade, and target location. Additionally, a different category for the 
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security present variable is significant in this model (security present but did not respond), while 
the security responded category was instead significant in all of the other models. Similar to all 
of the previous model, the year control variable remains significant, although marginally (p < 
.10). In this model, a total of 4 hypotheses are supported. A total of 5 variables are significant: 4 
independent variables, and 1 control variable. The variable with the most impact on the 
Southeast Asia model is the collateral deaths variable (Wald = 12.69), which is consistent with 
all of the previous models except South Asia, where the close proximity variable instead had the 
most impact.  
 As predicted, successful assassinations are 72.7 times more likely when terrorists are in 
close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 4.29, OR 
= 72.7). In support of what was hypothesized, when more collateral deaths occur during an 
attack, it is 8.67 times more likely to be successful compared to when lower numbers of deaths 
occur (β = 2.16, OR = 8.67). As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 24.48 times more 
likely to take place when terrorists use firearms compared to explosives (β = 3.20, OR = 24.48). 
Lastly, when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists, a successful assassination 
is 92% less likely compared to when security is not present (β = -2.56, OR = 0.08). With regards 
to the year control variable, successful assassinations are 24% less likely as the years progress, 
although this finding is marginally significant (p < .10) (β = -0.28, OR = 0.76).   
 In sum, the Southeast Asia model contains several of the same significant variables that 
were found in the prior models. However, unlike the previous models, a new category in the 
security present variable is significant (security present but does not respond). This is interesting 
since the category for security responded was significant in the other models. In addition, several 
variables that were significant in the other models failed to reach significance in this model 
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(victims struck, terrorist location, target motorcade, and target location). Similar to the previous 
models, the year control variable is significant, although marginally (p < .10). 
 
 Sub Saharan Africa 
 The results for the Sub Saharan Africa model are displayed in Table 19. This model is 
significant (χ2 = 147.209, p < .001) and very strong (Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.89). Of all of the 
models, this model is the best fitting, as it has the highest Nagelkerke pseudo R2 value compared 
to the others. Similar to the South Asia and Southeast Asia models, low counts were found for 
some of the variables due to the small sample size. For this model, the categories for the target 
type variable had to be condensed. Specifically, the other target type category was recoded to 
unofficial. For the weapon type variable, cases with multiple weapon types were recoded to 
indicate whatever primary weapon type was used. Additionally, sticky and suicide bombs were 
combined into the explosive category, while other weapon types were recoded as missing. Thus, 
the weapon type variable contains two categories: firearms and explosives. For the target 
location variable, the target work and target home categories were combined with the target 
inside category. Thus, the target inside category is inclusive of work and home. For the terrorist 
location variable, the motorcycle and motor vehicle categories were combined. The others 
around variable was changed to a dichotomous indicator of yes vs. no due to a low count in the 
only family and family & bystanders categories.  
Table 19: Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Success, 2005-2014, Sub Saharan Africa 
Independent Variable β Wald SE Odds Ratio Hypothesis 
Security Present  7.75    
     Sec. No Response 2.92 5.32 1.27 18.52* ✕ 
     Security Responded -1.67 1.74 1.26 .19 ✕ 
Others Around -.54 .37 .89 .58 ✕ 
Firearms 2.80 3.16 1.58 16.48^ ✓ 
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Official Target -.33 .10 1.04 .72 ✕ 
Target Location  5.78    
     In Motor Vehicle -.27 .07 1.01 .76 ✕ 
     Inside -4.26 5.59 1.80 .01* ✓ 
Target Motorcade -3.64 4.99 1.63 .03* ✓ 
Terrorist Location  2.34    
     In Motor Vehicle or  
     Motorcycle 
1.16 1.26 1.03 3.20 ✕ 
     Inside  2.41 1.73 1.83 11.16 ✕ 
Victims Struck -.58 5.46 .25 .56* ✕ 
Collateral Deaths 1.25 10.59 .38 3.49** ✓ 
Close Proximity 4.02 9.38 1.31 55.54** ✓ 
Day of Week  4.39    
     Monday 1.27 .95 1.30 3.54  
     Tuesday .37 .09 1.25 1.45  
     Wednesday -.28 .05 1.21 .76  
     Thursday -2.02 .85 2.20 .13  
     Friday -.13 .01 1.32 .88  
     Saturday 2.66 1.78 1.99 14.32  
Season  1.08    
     Winter -1.07 .69 1.29 .34  
     Spring -.47 .23 .97 .63  
     Summer -.95 .92 .98 .39  
Year -.33 2.18 .22 .72  
Capital City .36 .18 .85 1.43  
Multiple Terrorists 3.32 4.92 1.50 27.66*  
Constant 656.06 2.15 447.50 8E+284  
Model χ2 = 147.209***  df = 35 
     
 
-2 Log Likelihood = 38.554 
Nagelkerke R2 = .889 
     
 
N = 134 [missing 54] 
     
 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10 
   
 
Reference groups: Unofficial (target type); Terrorists outside physical building or structure 
(terrorist location); Target outside physical building or structure (target location); Explosives 
other than sticky bomb or suicide (weapon type); No others present (others around); Security 
not present (security present); Fall (season), Sunday (day of week) 
 
 Several variables that were found to be significant in the prior models remain significant 
in this model. These include: close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, target motorcade, 
weapon type, and security presence. Some variables that were significant in the partial, full, 
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Middle East, and South Asia models are no longer significant: target motorcade and year. For 
this model, target inside is now significant. Interestingly, similar to the Southeast Asia model, the 
category of security present but not responding is significant. However, unlike the Southeast 
Asia model, this category is significant in the opposite of what was expected. Overall, the 
opposite of what was hypothesized was found for two hypotheses: victims struck and security 
present but did not respond. With regards to control variables, this model is the only model 
where year is not significant. Similar to the South Asia model, the control variable for multiple 
terrorists is significant in this model. The results for this model show that a total of 5 hypotheses 
are supported, and a total of 8 variables are significant: 7 independent variables and 1 control 
variable. Similar to all of the models except the South Asia model, the collateral deaths variable 
exerts the largest influence on the model (Wald = 10.59).   
 As hypothesized, successful assassinations are 55.54 times more likely when terrorists 
are in close proximity to their targets compared to when they are not in close proximity (β = 
4.02, OR = 55.54). In contrast to what was predicted, successful assassinations are 44% less 
likely when higher numbers of victims are struck compared to when lower numbers are struck (β 
= -0.58, OR = 0.56). As predicted, successful assassinations are 3.49 times more likely when 
higher numbers of collateral deaths occur compared to when lower numbers occur (β = 1.25, OR 
= 3.49). Also as hypothesized, attackers are 97% less likely when a target is in a motorcade 
compared to when they are not in a motorcade (β = -3.64, OR = 0.03). As predicted, successful 
assassinations are 99% less likely when the target is inside (inclusive of at work or home) 
compared to when they are located outside a physical building or structure (β = -4.26, OR = 
0.01). Although marginally significant (p < .10), attacks are 16.48 times more likely to be 
successful when firearms are used compared to explosives (β = 2.80, OR = 16.48). In contrast to 
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what was hypothesized, successful assassinations are 18.52 times more likely to occur when 
security is present but does not respond compared to when no security is present at the scene of 
the attack (β = 2.92, OR = 18.52). Lastly, when multiple terrorists are present at the scene 
compared to individual terrorists, successful assassinations are 27.66 times more likely to occur 
(β = 3.32, OR = 27.66). 
 Overall, the Sub Saharan Africa model contains several of the same statistically 
significant variables that are present in the previous partial, full, and regional models. In contrast 
to the previous models, the target inside category is significant (although this category was 
condensed to include both home and work categories), and the opposite of what was predicted 
was discovered for one of the categories for the security present variable (security present but did 
not respond). Interestingly, like the Southeast Asia model but unlike the others, the target 
motorcade variable is not significant. Also in contrast to most of the other models, the terrorist 
location variable is not significant here. Interestingly, this is the only model where the year 
control variable is not significant. However, similar to the South Asia model, the multiple 
terrorists control variable is significant. 
 
Results Summary 
A summary of significant predictor variables across the full and regional models is 
displayed in Table 20. As this table shows, several variables remain consistently significant, and 
in the same direction, across each model. These include: close proximity, collateral deaths, and 
weapon type (firearms). The security present variable is also significant across all of the models, 
but the security present and responded hypothesis is significant for the full model, the Middle 
East model, and the South Asia model. In contrast, the security present but did not respond 
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hypothesis is significant in the Southeast Asia and Sub Saharan Africa model. However, the 
category is negatively associated with successful assassinations for the Southeast Asia model and 
positively associated with successful attacks in the Sub Saharan Africa model. Additionally, the 
victims struck and target motorcade variables are significant in all of the models except the 
Southeast Asia model. The terrorists on motorcycle hypothesis is significant for three of the 
models (full, Middle East, and South Asia), and insignificant in the Southeast Asia and Sub 
Saharan Africa model. The target in motor vehicle category is significant in both the full and 
Middle East models, while the condensed target in motor vehicle or motorcycle category is 
significant in the South Asia model. The target at work hypothesis is significant in the full and 
South Asia models, while the target at home hypothesis is significant in the full and Middle East 
model. The target inside hypothesis is significant in the Sub Saharan Africa model, although this 
category was condensed to include the work and home categories. Some variables are uniquely 
associated with some models and not others. For example, sticky bombs are significant in both 
the full model and the Middle East model, while the suicide attack hypothesis is supported for 
only the Middle East model. The multiple weapons and other weapon type categories are 
significant in the South Asia model, while the family & bystanders category is significant in only 





Overall, all of the regional models show an improved fit compared to the partial and full 
models, accounting for a higher percentage of the variance in successful assassinations. As 
discussed above, several variables are consistently significant across each model. However, some 
differences exist when the regional models are compared, with certain variables being uniquely 
associated with some regions and not others. Lastly, it is worth noting that a potential limitation 
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with the regional models is that the sample size reduces substantially. As shown in Table 20, the 
sample sizes for the Southeast Asia (N = 147) and Sub Saharan Africa (N = 134) models are 
substantially lower than the Middle East & North Africa (N = 623) and South Asia (N = 508) 
models. The smaller sample sizes for these models may explain why fewer variables are 
significant compared to the full model and the Middle East and South Asia models, which have 
substantially larger sample sizes. Future research can therefore focus on particular regions and 
obtain larger sample sizes to more fully tease out the regional contexts in which SCP specific 
variables influence successful assassinations.   
 
CH. 7: DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from all of the regression models are supportive of using SCP to examine 
successful assassinations conducted by terrorists. This approach can assist researchers, policy 
makers, and practitioners in the development of effective counterterrorism measures directed 
towards the prevention and disruption of assassination attacks. As demonstrated by each model, 
findings support various SCP themes, including capable guardianship, weapon type, target 
location, terrorist location, attack intensity, and distance. Additionally, while some regional 
differences exist regarding the impact of SCP variables on successful attacks, the influence of 








 Capable Guardianship 
Results from the full regression model testing the effect of SCP variables on all regions 
(Table 15) demonstrate support for the role capable guardianship in Cohen and Felson’s (1979) 
routine activities theory. Specifically, when security is present and responds to terrorists during 
an assassination, the attack is less likely to be successful compared to when no security is 
present. This parallels the results by Mandala and Freilich (2017a), who similarly find security 
response to be significantly related to successful assassinations. Also similar to Mandala and 
Freilich’s (2017a) study, this model finds that the presence of security alone is not associated 
with successful assassinations. Relatedly, the hypotheses for informal capable guardians in the 
form of others present at the scene (i.e., family of the target, bystanders) are not significantly 
associated with successful assassinations, suggesting that the most effective guardians for 
disrupting an assassination are armed security guards or police. These findings further indicate 
that security personnel not only need to be armed, but they also need to have an opportunity to 
respond successfully deflect an assassination and protect the target. As explained by Mandala 
and Freilich (2017a), security must have the ability to realize when an attack is either imminent 
or when it is actually taking place. This finding is directly related to training, as security 
personnel must have sufficient training to recognize when an opportunity exists to effectively 
retaliate against terrorists when attacked.  
There are many historical examples of alert and trained security personnel disrupting 
terrorist attacks. For example, in the winter of 1999-2000, an al Qaeda terrorist tried to enter the 
U.S. through Canada to bomb Los Angeles International Airport. The disruption of this plan is 
credited to a Customs inspector who questioned the terrorist after finding his behavior suspicious 
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(9/11 Commission, 2004). History similarly provides examples of the detrimental impact lapses 
in security can have in creating opportunities for attacks. For instance, the 9/11 Commission 
Report finds that when they arrived for their flights on September 11th, over half of the hijackers 
had been flagged by the Federal Aviation Authority’s (FAA) profiling system, known as the 
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). Despite being flagged by this 
system, only their bags were subjected to additional inspection. Thus, had security taken 
additional steps to screen the flagged hijackers, some of the hijackers may have been prevented 
from boarding their planes on 9/11.   
This finding supports Clarke and Newman’s (2006) target selection criteria (EVIL 
DONE), where terrorists select targets that they deem as easy to attack. When security guards are 
able to respond to terrorists during an attack, the effort required for the terrorists to successfully 
assassinate their target is substantially increased. The target is not “easy” to attack when it is 
protected by armed, capable and skilled security personnel. Since terrorists are less likely to 
select targets that they see as difficult to successfully attack (Gruenewald et al., 2015; Klein et 
al., 2016), target-hardening measures, like armed security guards, are essential in preventing 
against successful assassinations. Interestingly, these findings align with Fein and Vossekuil’s 
(1999) study of attackers and near-lethal approachers of public figures in the U.S. The authors 
find that subjects choose their targets based off of their assessment that an opportunity to attack 
exists, as well as if the attack would fulfill their goals. In addition, subjects are known to 
abandon their attack plans if they believe that they will not be successful. 
A review of this study’s various open source materials highlights the importance of 
formal guardianship (i.e., police, security guards) in protecting targets and disrupting 
assassination attacks. For example, in several of the unsuccessful cases, police discovered and 
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defused bombs before they could detonate and harm the target. In other cases, vigilant security 
personnel disrupted attacks by identifying suicide bombers through their suspicious behavior and 
then shielding the target from the bomber. In one unsuccessful attack, the terrorists concealed 
pistols in their boots and passed through numerous security checks undetected. However, at the 
last security checkpoint, a guard became suspicious and effectively stopped the terrorists from 
harming the target. Several of the successful assassination cases demonstrate the severe 
repercussions stemming from ineffective security. In some incidents, lax security was cited as a 
reason why the terrorists were successful. One example is the assassination of former Pakistan 
Prime Minister Banazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007. In this case, the open source material 
notes that Bhutto had asked for increased protection in the form of a police escort along with 
jamming devices against bombs, but the government denied this request. Bhutto was assassinated 
while waving to her supporters through the sunroof of her vehicle, and the security that was 
present was blamed for allowing people to get too close to her. These examples illustrate the 
utility of security checkpoints in protecting vulnerable targets, as well as the critical role that 
effectively trained security personnel play in disrupting assassinations. Breakdowns in security, 
as seen in the Bhutto case, create opportunities for terrorists to easily attack their targets. Armed 
security personnel and checkpoints increase the effort required for terrorists to successfully 
access and kill their targets. These measures also increase the risks involved for terrorists, as they 
are more likely to be discovered and captured.  
 
Weapons 
As predicted, successful assassinations are more likely when terrorists use firearms, 
rather than explosives. Similarly, Mandala and Freilich (2017a; 2017b), find firearms to be 
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associated with successful assassinations. This result aligns with Clarke and Newman’s (2006) 
weapons opportunity pillar and acronym for terrorist weapon selection (MURDEROUS). In 
addition, this finding supports the SCP techniques of increasing the effort, increasing the risks, 
and reducing the rewards for terrorists. Since terrorists are known to prefer uncomplicated 
weapons that are easy to use and obtain over more sophisticated weapons, it is not surprising that 
firearms are associated with successful assassinations. Firearms are not as complex as 
explosives, and therefore require little training and skill to use. As a result, less effort required of 
terrorists to use firearms. Firearms allow terrorists to increase their rewards, since they are more 
effective than explosives at murdering specific individuals over large groups of people (see 
Mandala & Freilich, 2017a; 2017b). Firearms are also less risky for terrorists since they are 
easily obtainable and concealable, and thus more likely to go undetected than explosives 
(Jasparro, 2010; Gill & Corner, 2016). This finding aligns with Legault and Hendrickson’s 
(2009) study, where terrorists were found to be more likely than other felons to be convicted of 
firearm-related crimes. 
This model also supports the hypothesis that successful assassinations are less likely 
when sticky bombs are used compared to other types of explosives. Interestingly, Freilich and 
Mandala (2017a) do not find sticky bombs to be significantly associated with assassinations. 
However, this may be because Mandala and Freilich (2017a) utilized a substantially smaller 
sample size than the sample size used in this study. Like the firearms finding, this result aligns 
with Clarke and Newman’s weapons opportunity pillar and assertions regarding terrorist weapon 
selection (MURDEROUS). As noted, sticky bombs are a more complicated weapon compared to 
other types of explosives, as well as firearms. While sticky bombs are less likely to be detected 
than other explosives due to their small size, they require more skill and thus more effort to 
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build. In addition to the skill required to build a sticky bomb, terrorists must be able to locate the 
target’s vehicle, attach the bomb without raising suspicion, and detonate the bomb on time. 
 Terrorists must therefore exert a lot of effort to successfully carry out an assassination 
using a sticky bomb. This is confirmed by the open source materials, which reveal several events 
where the sticky bomb did not detonate on time, thereby missing the target and reducing the 
terrorists’ rewards. Other cases demonstrate how alert security personnel successfully detected 
sticky bombs on vehicles to reduce the terrorists’ rewards. These results are supportive of 
research that finds that terrorists opt for weapons, targets, and attack plans that are less 
complicated over those that are more complex. In their study of lone-actors, Gill and Corner 
(2016) explain that these terrorists must operate under various technical, financial, and practical 
constraints. As a result, lone-actors often have to re-assess their plans and abandon those that are 
more complicated in favor of simpler plots (Gill & Corner, 2016). 
Overall, these weapons findings suggest that counterterrorism measures should focus on 
firearms to adequately prevent against successful assassinations and safeguard vulnerable targets. 
Metal detectors at entry and exit points can help increase the risks involved for terrorists, as they 
increase their likelihood of being detected and captured. Strategically placed security 
checkpoints along with electronic surveillance can also help increase the risks involved for 
terrorists. Installing bullet-resistant windows and doors on motor vehicles can make it more 
difficult for terrorists to murder their target. Additionally, firearms tracking systems and 
registration requirements can potentially help increase the effort for terrorists in obtaining 
firearms. Bulletproof vests for targets, along with armed guards, are more target-hardening 
measures that can effectively reduce terrorists’ rewards. Lastly, arming the target is one 
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protection measure that can effectively protect the target and ultimately reduce the rewards for 
terrorists. 
The open source materials highlight how many of these measures effectively protect 
targets from assassinations involving firearms. In particular, there are several examples of armed 
targets returning fire and protecting themselves during unsuccessful assassination events. In 
many of these cases, the target successfully kills or injures the terrorists. As discussed, there are 
numerous examples of officials using security checkpoints to detect terrorists attempting to 
approach their targets and ultimately disrupting attacks. Several unsuccessful assassination cases 
further demonstrate the importance of bulletproof vehicles in not only protecting targets from 
death, but also from sustaining any injuries. 
 
Targets 
 The full model supports many of the target related hypotheses. When the target is at work 
or at home, the assassination is less likely to be successful compared to when the target is outside 
a physical building or structure during the attack. When a target is in a motor vehicle, the attack 
is less likely to be successful compared to when they are located outside a physical building or 
structure. Lastly, successful assassinations are less likely when a target is travelling in a 
motorcade compared to when no motorcade is in place. These findings both partly contradict as 
well as align with Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) study. Mandala and Freilich (2017a) find that 
successful assassinations are not related to whether or not the target is attacked at their place of 
work. They also do not find motorcades to be significantly associated with successful attacks. 
However, they do find successful assassinations to be less likely when the target is located in a 
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motor vehicle, rather than outside, during an attack. As noted earlier, Mandala and Freilich’s 
(2017a) small sample size may account for the differences in results.  
 These results indicate that targets are more likely to have security and other capable 
guardians at their places of work and at their residences compared to when they are located 
outside of buildings or structures. More effort is required of terrorists to successfully attack 
targets at these locations that have protection measures in place, and there is an increased risk for 
terrorists to be detected by security. Thus, vulnerable targets should limit the time they spend 
outside, especially among crowds, without protection since less effort is required of terrorists to 
carry out an attack outside compared to inside a physical building or structure. Various 
protection measures can be implemented to fortify buildings where targets may work or reside. 
For example, barriers and fences can be strategically installed in front of such buildings to 
increase the effort for terrorists to approach the target.  
A motor vehicle offers another form of protection and has the advantage of being mobile, 
so it can assist the target in outmaneuvering the terrorists and evading an attack (i.e., speeding, 
swerving). If the vehicle is reinforced with bullet-resistant doors and windows, then it can further 
serve to increase the effort required of terrorists and reduce their rewards by inhibiting their 
ability to successfully attack the target. A motorcade is an additional protection measure that 
targets can utilize when travelling by motor vehicle. Motorcades usually have security personnel 
and other capable guardians present, increasing the risks involved for terrorists since the 
opportunities to successfully attack the target are more limited. The fact that motorcades are 
often made up of several vehicles can make it difficult for terrorists to determine which vehicle 
to attack, thereby reducing their rewards if they attack the wrong car where the target is not 
inside. The motorcade essentially adds a step to the script of the attack, as terrorists have to not 
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only determine the precise vehicle the target is in, but also figure this out in a relatively short 
time span. 
The open source articles provide many examples of effective measures involving motor 
vehicles that protect the target. In one unsuccessful assassination, the location of the target in the 
vehicle proved to be a key protective factor. In particular, because the target was seated in the 
middle of the vehicle when attacked, the target was able to escape the unharmed. There are 
multiple examples of unsuccessful attacks involving bullet-proof vehicles, suggesting that these 
vehicles can effectively reduce the terrorists’ rewards. The open sources further support the 
effectiveness of targets travelling in both bullet-proof vehicles and motorcades. Some 
unsuccessful cases also cite the role of motorcades in confusing the terrorists and causing them 
to attack the wrong vehicle. Numerous unsuccessful cases credit the skill and alertness of the 
driver as being an important factor in protecting the target. In one case, the driver maneuvered 
the vehicle away from the attack to safety despite being fired on. In another example, an alert 
driver was credited for saving the target by recognizing that terrorists were attempting to stop the 
vehicle. An attentive driver was again credited for saving the target when the terrorists attempted 
to stop the vehicle. The resourceful driver initially stopped the car, but then sped up and fled 
away when the terrorists advanced towards the vehicle.  
Relatedly, several successful assassinations indicate that drivers should be especially alert 
and avoid stopping the vehicle when possible. Numerous successful cases involve the terrorists 
shooting and killing the target when their car either stops or slows down. In one example, the 
target was killed when he slowed down at a speed bump, and another involved the target being 
was killed when he slowed his car down at an intersection. In one incident, the target was 
attacked and killed when he stopped his car at a roundabout. These examples illustrate how 
107 
	
everyday traffic conditions (i.e., speed bumps, intersections, and roundabouts) can create 
opportunities for successful assassinations. While these are not necessarily conditions that can be 
easily avoided, skilled drivers can assist targets in escaping injury or death by recognizing 
opportunities for attacks and by employing evasive tactics to maneuver the vehicle to safety. 
These cases underscore the need for drivers to be adequately trained to respond to an attack. 
Similar to how security and police personnel participate in scenario-based trainings for terrorist 
attacks and mass-casualty events, such as active shooter incidents, drivers could also partake in 
these types of trainings. In particular, scenario-based trainings could incorporate actors to portray 
both terrorists and bystanders to mimic real world situations. These trainings would have the 
benefit of allowing drivers to practice effective driving tactics for evading terrorists during an 
assassination attack. Drivers could also receive certifications for successfully completing this 
training, which would benefit vulnerable targets as they could ensure whether or not their drivers 
have been trained. 
 
Terrorists 
As predicted, when terrorists attack from a motorcycle, assassinations are more likely to 
occur compared to when they attack from outside a physical building or structure. This finding is 
supportive of Clarke and Newman’s (2006) tools opportunity pillar, a key construct in their four 
pillars of terrorist opportunity that has rarely, if ever, been tested. In fact, this dissertation 
represents one of the first studies to empirically test this pillar of opportunity. This study also 
extends Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) analysis, which did not include terrorist use of 
motorcycles or motor vehicles. The incorporation of the tools opportunity pillar thus represents 
another unique contribution that this study is making to the literature. A motorcycle essentially 
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represents a tool that can assist terrorists in successfully assassinating their target. In particular, a 
motorcycle can help terrorists approach their target relatively easily since motorcycles are 
smaller and more maneuverable than a vehicle. These characteristics can enable terrorists to 
swiftly navigate through traffic and escape the scene of the attack, reducing their risks and 
ultimately increasing their rewards. These features may further explain why the model does not 
find successful assassinations to be associated with terrorists using motor vehicles. Since 
motorcycles allow terrorists to attack while mobile, they can similarly assist terrorists in 
attacking targets that are mobile (i.e., in a motor vehicle or motorcycle). At the same time, 
motorcycles enable terrorists to attack stationary targets (i.e., targets located outside of buildings 
or structures).  
Various measures can be used to protect against successful assassinations involving 
terrorists on motorcycles. Many of these measures are similarly applicable to attacks involving 
terrorists in motor vehicles. For example, strategically placed road barriers and street closures 
can impede terrorists using either motor vehicles or motorcycles from successfully approaching 
their targets. Placing limitations on and controlling access routes can further serve to limit the 
target’s exposure to terrorists travelling via motorcycle or motor vehicle. Traffic restrictions can 
be used as a protection measure when implemented in areas that are particularly susceptible to 
attacks. 
Additional measures to protect against assassinations by terrorists on motorcycles are 
illustrated in the open source materials. As a result of so many attacks being carried out by 
perpetrators on motorcycles, the police in one unsuccessful case were cited as instituting a ban 
on motorcycle travel at night. While this type of ban may not be feasible in all jurisdictions, 
authorities could consider implementing a motorcycle ban on days or locations where a 
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vulnerable target is traveling. Other unsuccessful cases illustrate how motorcycles can be used as 
tools by terrorists in ways other than facilitating travel. For example, in one unsuccessful attack, 
a bomb was attached to a motorcycle that had a fake license plate and had been reported stolen 
the previous month. Other cases similarly note how terrorists frequently use vehicles without 
license plates. These cases are indicative of how traditional crime (i.e., auto-theft) can be 
connected to terrorist activity. They further demonstrate how the lack of a license plate is a 
warning sign that law enforcement, as well as the general public, should be wary of. In fact, 
many successful assassinations involved terrorists using stolen vehicles/motorcycles along with 
vehicles/motorcycles without license plates. These issues are reminiscent of the first World 
Trade Center bombing in 1993. Following the 1993 attacks, the FBI identified a piece of a truck 
that belonged to a rental van that had been reported stolen the previous day by a terrorist 
involved in the attack, Mohammed Salameh. Salameh reportedly called the rental office 
repeatedly to get his $400 deposit back, and this information proved integral in helping the 
authorities with their investigation (9/11 Commission, 2004). This is further illustrated by the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Following the bombing, Timothy McVeigh was captured when 




In contrast to what was hypothesized, the full model finds that when higher numbers of 
victims are struck (i.e., injuries and fatalities), successful assassinations are less likely to occur 
compared to when lower numbers of victims are struck. While this finding appears to contradict 
the SCP notion that terrorists seek to obtain high casualties in attacks, it could speak to how the 
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tactic of assassination is unique compared to other types of terrorist attacks. Specifically, 
assassinations target specific individuals, rather than groups of people. This result could 
therefore indicate that successful attacks result in fewer injuries and deaths as a direct result of 
terrorists seeking to murder specific individuals rather than groups of people. In support of what 
was predicted, when higher numbers of collateral deaths (i.e., deaths other than the target or 
terrorists) occur, attacks are more likely to be successful compared to when lower numbers of 
collateral deaths take place. While this finding appears somewhat contradictory of the previous 
result regarding victims struck, it could be indicative of bystanders and/or family members being 
near the target during the attack. It may also suggest that terrorists seek to eliminate any potential 
guardians close to the target that could disrupt the assassination.  
These results speak to the need to implement protection measures that reduce terrorists’ 
rewards. For example, terrorists’ rewards can be reduced by authorities rapidly cleaning up the 
scene of an assassination. Cleaning up the scene in the immediate aftermath of an attack reduces 
terrorist rewards by limiting their ability to incorporate the images of the destruction into their 
propaganda materials (Clarke & Newman, 2006). To prevent against collateral deaths, authorities 
should limit the proximity of bystanders to vulnerable targets. For example, if there is a 
substantiated threat against a politician or government official, those individuals should limit 
their contact with members of the public, especially when outside and in open spaces. Increased 
security measures at events where vulnerable targets are located can also serve to reduce rewards 
for terrorists. One measure could be to limit the types of bags people are allowed to bring into 
event locations. This type of restriction was recently implement by the National Football League 





clear bags no larger than 12” x 6” x 12”. This type of measure protects the target from an 
assassination as well as bystanders that could be injured or killed during an attack. 
The open source materials for both successful and unsuccessful assassinations help 
explain the results regarding victims struck and collateral deaths, as well as provide examples of 
how authorities can attempt to limit the intensity of an attack. There are several unsuccessful 
assassination incidents where either roadside bombs or sticky bombs explode too late or too 
early, thus missing the target but harming bystanders. These mistimed explosions may therefore 
partly account for why successful assassinations are negatively associated with the total number 
of victims struck. Interestingly, some of the unsuccessful cases noted the role of responding 
security officials in creating additional injuries and fatalities. In multiple incidents, security 
personnel were specifically blamed for firing indiscriminately at crowds of civilians when they 
responded to the terrorists, ultimately adding to the casualties and injuries at the scene of the 
attack.  
Both successful and unsuccessful cases have extensive examples of terrorists creatively 
hiding their weapons. A few cases involve bombs hidden under trash piles, while the bombers in 
some suicide attacks hid their explosives inside their turbans. In one case, a bomb was planted in 
the target’s shoe while he was praying at a mosque. These events illustrate the need for 
vulnerable targets and security personnel to be alert and mindful of the innovative ways terrorists 
alter their tactics. One open source specifically highlights how Boko Haram constantly changes 
its tactics and attacks the least expected places. In several successful and unsuccessful 
assassination cases, the terrorists disguised themselves to evade security and appear non-
threatening. In a few cases the attackers dressed in burqas and women’s clothing. Several 
incidents note how the terrorists disguised themselves as security, police, or military personnel 
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by wearing their respective uniforms. Given the frequency with which terrorists choose to don 
military and police uniforms to disguise themselves, efforts should be taken by these 
organizations to limit the sale of official uniforms to non-members of the service. For example, 
proper identification should be required to purchase these uniforms, and limitations should be 
placed on where they are sold (i.e., they should only be sold by the respective military or police 
agency and not by any third party). Other cases illustrate how terrorists use disguise to fit in at 
the attack location. In one incident, the gunman disguised himself in a school uniform and 
successfully killed the headmaster of the school. Another gunman disguised himself as a mason 
to successfully assassinate his target. In one case, several terrorists wore municipal employees’ 
uniforms to facilitate their attack.  
Numerous successful and unsuccessful assassinations also involved either current or 
former police personnel carrying out the attack. In one case, all 6 of the terrorists involved were 
on the police force, while another event was perpetrated by a former police officer. In one 
successful attack, the target was killed by his own bodyguard. In another case, the target’s guard 
led him into a separate room in his residence, away from any capable guardians, and shot and 
killed him. These cases are reminiscent of the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi, who was killed by her own security guard. More recently, in December 2016, the 
Russian ambassador to Turkey was assassinated by an off-duty police officer at an art exhibit in 
Ankara. These cases show that security personnel represent unique risks since they not only have 
easy access to targets, but also to weapons. In addition, because they typically represent 
individuals that are trusted by targets, they can more easily plan and carry out an attack without 
raising suspicion. These incidents further demonstrate the need for periodic background checks 
to be applied to security personnel, especially those who work in close proximity to the target. 
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As the above examples all demonstrate, an awareness of how terrorists continue to evolve in 
their activities and tactics will help authorities detect suspicious activity and intervene to reduce 
terrorist rewards.  
 
Distance 
Similar to Mandala and Freilich’s (2017a) study, when terrorists are in close proximity to 
their targets (i.e., point-blank range), successful assassinations are more likely to occur compared 
to when they are not in close proximity. This result demonstrates support for the SCP literature 
that explores how terrorists select their targets and prepare for attacks. In particular, it aligns with 
the “near” element in Clarke and Newman’s (2006) EVIL DONE target selection acronym. 
Clarke and Newman (2006) even argue that this is the most important factor when terrorists 
select their targets. This result also supports Clarke and Newman’s (2005) target opportunity 
pillar. Although more effort is required of terrorists to get close to their targets, especially those 
targets that are well protected, they are more likely to successfully kill the target when in close 
proximity. Terrorist rewards are increased, as are target opportunities, when terrorists are able to 
get near their targets.  
Various measures can be directed towards preventing terrorists from getting in close 
proximity to their targets. As previously mentioned, vulnerable targets should limit their 
exposure to crowds and reduce their time spent outside without security personnel. When there 
are substantiated threats against any particular government officials, such as presidents or prime 
ministers, those individuals should especially consider limiting their interaction with the public. 
For example, the assassination of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has been 
attributed to the fact that the public was allowed so close to Bhutto. Security checkpoints, road 
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closures, and barriers around locations where targets live or work can assist authorities in 
controlling public access to targets. Vulnerable targets should also regularly alter their daily 
routines to and from work and/or home to evade terrorists attempting to track their routines and 
travel patterns. When terrorists cannot become familiar with a target’s travel patterns, more 
effort is required for them to determine where and when they should attack.  
Examples illustrating the importance of targets altering their daily routines are seen in the 
open source materials. In one successful assassination incident, the materials note how the 
terrorists had complete information about the target’s routine and the route he would take for 
dropping off his children before work. In a few other cases, the terrorists attacked when they 
knew the target’s security guards were not present. Terrorists clearly attempt to familiarize 
themselves with the daily routines of their targets. To further limit proximity to terrorists, 
vulnerable targets should be wary of strangers who seek to confirm their identity, as this could be 
a sign that the individual requesting this confirmation is a terrorist. As noted in several of the 
successful assassination cases, terrorists often ask their targets for their identity and then attack 
as soon as the target confirms who they are. To reduce terrorist rewards, vulnerable targets 
should not confirm their identity when requested to by strangers who approach them on the street 
or elsewhere.  
 
 Control Variables & Insignificant Variables 
 Regarding the significant control variables, the results from the full model are largely 
reflective of the findings by Mandala and Freilich (2017a), in that successful assassinations are 
associated with the year and day of the week control variables. However, Mandala and Freilich 
(2017a) find successful assassinations to be less likely to occur on a Tuesday compared to a 
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Sunday, while this model instead finds that successful assassinations are more likely to occur on 
a Tuesday compared to a Sunday. This finding is interesting considering how research has 
typically found that crime occurs more often on the weekend compared to other days of the 
week. The fact that this model finds successful assassinations to be less likely in recent years is 
also interesting considering how there has been an increase in total assassinations taking place 
worldwide from 2005-2014 (Mandala, 2016). Thus, while assassinations overall are increasing 
during this time period, successful assassinations are occurring less often. Perhaps this is 
indicative of prevention and protection measures becoming more effective at disrupting 
successful attacks in recent years.  
 Several variables are insignificant in the full model. In particular, the target type 
hypothesis is not supported. This contradicts Mandala and Freilich (2017b), who find successful 
assassinations to be significantly less likely to involve official government targets compared to 
unofficial targets. At the same time, target type is insignificant in a separate study by Mandala 
and Freilich (2017a). For the terrorist location variable, terrorists in motor vehicle and terrorists 
inside a building or structure are insignificant. This is interesting considering that target in motor 
vehicle is significant. This illustrates that the target location and terrorist location variables are 
not highly related to each other. With regards to the other target location categories, target on 
motorcycle and target inside are insignificant. This contrasts the finding by Mandala and Freilich 
(2017a), who find successful assassinations to be less likely when the target is inside rather than 
outside during an attack. With regards to the weapon type hypotheses, suicide attacks are not 
significantly related to successful assassinations, which also contradicts Mandala and Freilich 
(2017b), who find successful assassinations to be less likely when a suicide attack is involved. 
Considering how the SCP literature finds suicide terrorism to be more deadly and effective in 
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reaching targets than non-suicide terrorism, this finding is surprising. The use of multiple 
weapons types and other weapon types are also insignificant. The remaining hypotheses 
regarding capable guardians are not supported (security is present but does not respond; family 
around; bystanders around; family and bystanders around). Lastly, the control variables for 




In general, the regional models contain many of the same significant variables as the full 
model. However, these models also contain some differences. This suggests that while SCP 
exerts an influence on successful assassinations in all regions, some factors are uniquely 
associated with certain regions and not others. This further supports the need to be as specific as 
possible when examining different forms of crime and terrorism. Clarke (1995) has long argued 
that the opportunity structures for robbery, for example, may well vary by location and time. In 
line with that and what Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, assassinations in the Middle East 
may vary compared to assassinations occurring in Sub Saharan Africa. Thus, a regional analysis 
of assassinations by terrorists can be informative for obtaining a more comprehensive 
understanding of the tactic.  
The regions analyzed in this study contain the countries cited in the GTD codebook 
(National Consortium, 2016). The Middle East & North Africa model contains assassinations 
that occurred in the following 22 countries during the time period of 2005-2014: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank 
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and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, and Yemen. The South Asia region analyzes attacks that 
occurred in the following 9 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Southeast Asia model examines the following 12 
countries: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Vietnam. Lastly, the 49 countries included in the Sub 
Saharan Africa model include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea‐Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, People's Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Rhodesia, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
Due to small sample sizes, individual models could only be conducted for these 4 
regions. To further tease out how SCP influences different regions, future research can utilize 
larger sample sizes for these same regions as well as analyze a larger sample of assassinations in 
other regions, such as Eastern Europe, South America, etc.  
 
Middle East & North Africa 
The model for the Middle East & North Africa reveals several similarities with the full 
regression model. In fact, it contains all of the same significant variables, with a few exceptions. 
In the full model, successful assassinations are less likely when the target is at work when 
attacked. However, this hypothesis is no longer significant in the Middle East & North Africa 
model. Perhaps this finding differs from the main model because targets in the Middle East are 
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attacked more often at locations other than work. In addition, workplace assassinations in the 
region may require more effort on the part of terrorists to carry out if there is heightened security 
in place at these locations.  
The results for the Middle East & North Africa further differ from the main model in that 
successful assassinations are significantly more likely when suicide bombs are used compared to 
other types of explosives. Interestingly, this is the only model that supports this hypothesis, and it 
contrasts Mandala and Freilich (2017b), who actually find successful assassinations in all regions 
to be negatively associated with suicide attacks. This difference may be explained by the fact that 
Mandala and Freilich (2017b) examined a much longer time period (1970-2014) than the time 
period analyzed in this study (2005-2014). Perhaps suicide attacks are positively associated with 
successful assassinations in the Middle East and North Africa because terrorists utilize suicide 
attacks more often in this region compared to terrorists in other regions. As noted previously, 
suicide attacks reduce the risks involved for terrorists since they do not have to consider an exit 
plan. Since research also finds suicide attacks to be particularly effective at murdering targets, 
these types of attacks thus increase the rewards involved for terrorists.  
The last difference unique to the Middle East & North Africa model is the finding that 
when family of the target, as well as bystanders, are present during an attack, then a successful 
assassination is less likely to take place compared to when no one else is present. This result 
shows that family and bystanders in the Middle East & North Africa serve as effective capable 
guardians that can prevent against successful assassinations. These individuals can help to detect 
and report suspicious activity or bombs, as well as help shield and protect the target when 
attacked. As discussed in some of the open source materials, these individuals can also 
potentially respond and fight back against the terrorists during an attack.   
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The open source materials illustrate the determination of terrorists to avoid detection. For 
example, one attack involved a suicide bomber in a wheelchair. In another case, a female suicide 
bomber used a police ID to get admitted into an event where the target was located, successfully 
evading detection by security. Several suicide attacks are successful due to weak or ineffective 
security. In one case, security did not check a female who ultimately turned out to be the suicide 
bomber. In another, the target asked security not to frisk anyone, resulting in the bomber easily 
approaching and embracing the target. In one assassination, it was discovered that because the 
suicide bomber was over 50, he was able to approach the target unnoticed. One successful 
suicide attack was reportedly carried out by the target’s niece. Other examples demonstrate the 
easy access that some suicide bombers have to their targets. Several successful incidents involve 
the suicide bomber simply walking up and embracing the target prior to detonating. In one case, 
the bomber walked into the target’s office pretending to be looking for work, and then detonated. 
In another attack, the bomber was among the guests at a wedding that the target was attending. 
These cases all illustrate the importance of performing regular security checks on individuals that 
do not appear threatening or suspicious. Terrorists clearly make efforts to disguise themselves to 
fit in at the locations where they attack.  
To prevent opportunities for successful assassinations, especially in the Middle East 
where suicide attacks are more prevalent, security must remain vigilant at all times to detect both 
potential bombers and environmental conditions that may make it easier for terrorists to 
approach their target. One successful case in particular illustrates this point. During this attack, 
the target’s vehicle was parked next to a fruit vendor’s stall. The open sources note that a narrow 
corridor formed between the target’s vehicle and the fruit stall, which people had been passing 
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through. It was this corridor that the suicide bomber used to approach and successfully kill the 
target. 
The open sources also demonstrate how capable guardians, in the form of bystanders and 
family of the target, can intervene during attacks and prevent successful assassinations. In 
numerous unsuccessful attacks, alert civilians have been credited for detecting suspicious 
behavior as well as bombs. In one particular unsuccessful assassination, community members 
intervened and stopped gunmen who were firing on a tribal leader’s home. Other cases involve 
residents spotting a bomb outside of a target’s residence and alerting the police who then defuse 
it. One attack was unsuccessful as a result of a civilian bystander intervening and saving a group 
of diplomats under attack. Family members can also effectively retaliate against attackers. In one 
example, the target’s son returned fire and was able to kill one of the terrorists. As these 
incidents show, family members and bystanders can effectively disrupt and prevent successful 
assassinations. The fact that this finding is only significant for the Middle East & North Africa 
model may indicate that it is more difficult for terrorists in this region to carry out an attack when 
the target is isolated.  
 
South Asia 
The South Asia model contains all of the same significant variables as the full model, 
with a few differences. As noted previously, due to the regional models containing smaller 
sample sizes than the full model, categories for some variables had to be collapsed. For the South 
Asia model, the target location categories of target in motor vehicle and target in motorcycle 
were combined. This resulting category is significant, and successful assassinations are 
negatively associated with the target being in a motor vehicle or motorcycle. By comparison, the 
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full model finds the target in motor vehicle category to be significantly and negatively associated 
with successful assassinations, but the target in motorcycle category is insignificant. Since these 
categories are combined in the South Asia model, it is not possible to distinguish between the 
influence of the target in motor vehicle and target in motorcycle categories. Another difference 
between the South Asia and full model is that the main model finds the target at home hypothesis 
to be significant, while this hypothesis is no longer supported in the South Asia model. This may 
be a result of targets in South Asia being more vulnerable at locations other than their residences. 
Thus, perhaps more opportunities for successful assassinations exist for terrorists at other 
locations. In contrast to the full model, sticky bombs are no longer significant in the South Asia 
model. The literature suggests that sticky bombs are more prevalent in the Middle East than 
elsewhere. Thus, perhaps sticky bombs are insignificant in this model because they are not 
utilized as often in South Asia compared to other regions like the Middle East.  
Interestingly, while firearms remain significantly associated with successful 
assassinations, two additional weapon type categories are likewise significantly associated with 
successful attacks in South Asia. In particular, successful assassinations are positively related to 
weapon types other than firearms and explosives, as well as the use of multiple types. These 
findings are unique to the South Asia model, as they remain insignificant in all other models. 
Since the other weapon type category contains all weapons other than explosives, sticky bombs, 
and firearms, this result could indicate that other types of weapons that are less complex, like 
knives, are more prevalent in South Asia than other regions. This would support elements of the 
MURDEROUS acronym for weapon selection (Clarke & Newman, 2006), as knives are easier to 
acquire, easily concealable, and easier to use compared to other more sophisticated weapons like 
explosives and firearms. The use of simpler weapon types, like knives, therefore reduce the 
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effort and risks involved for terrorists. If less complex weapon types are used by terrorists in 
South Asia, then perhaps that is why successful assassinations are also significantly more likely 
to occur when terrorists use multiple weapon types. While simpler and less complex weapons 
may be easier for terrorists to use and acquire, they may also be less effective when used alone, 
and thus multiple weapon types may need to be used simultaneously by terrorists for the attack to 
be successful.  
Overall, these findings suggest that prevention measures in South Asia need to be focused 
on all weapon types that can be utilized in an assassination, and not just firearms and explosives. 
Anecdotally, the open source materials suggest that the use of knives are more prevalent in South 
Asia, as well as Southeast Asia, compared to other regions like the Middle East and Sub Saharan 
Africa. This further highlights the need for target hardening measures and the need for 




The Southeast Asia model contains substantially fewer significant variables than the main 
model, but it does contain some similarities. Specifically, the close proximity, collateral deaths, 
and firearms hypotheses remain supported in this model. Interestingly, the victims struck, 
terrorist location, target location, and remaining weapon type hypotheses are all insignificant. It 
is worth noting that some of these differences may be attributable to the small sample size that 
characterizes this model (n = 147). The Southeast Asia model does contain a new and unique 
significant finding compared to the other models: successful assassinations are less likely to take 
place when security is present at the scene of the attack, but does not engage the terrorists, 
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compared to when no security is present. This result demonstrates support for the idea of capable 
guardianship in the form of security guards or law enforcement protecting the target. This is also 
interesting considering how the main model only finds security response to have a significant 
impact on reducing successful assassinations, and the presence of security that does not respond 
is insignificant. In contrast to the main model, it appears that the presence of security alone has a 
deterrent effect on successful attacks in Southeast Asia. Thus, terrorists in this region may 
believe there is too much effort or risk involved if they see that a target is protected by security. 
While security personnel in this region still need to be sufficiently trained to effectively respond 
to terrorists, these results may indicate that security personnel do not get a chance to respond 
when attacked. For example, perhaps terrorists in Southeast Asia do not spend as much time at 
the scene of the attack as terrorists in other regions do. If they notice security personnel near the 
target, then the terrorists may be concerned with fleeing the scene as fast as possible to avoid 
capture, thereby limiting the ability of security personnel on site to respond while simultaneously 
limiting the likelihood of the assassination being successful.  
 
Sub Saharan Africa 
Like the Southeast Asia model, the results from the Sub Saharan Africa analysis contain 
fewer significant variables than the main model, while also supporting some similar hypotheses. 
This model finds a few additional hypotheses to be supported compared to the Southeast Asia 
model, while also having the smallest sample size of all the regional analyses (n = 134). Like the 
full model, the hypotheses for close proximity, victims struck, collateral deaths, firearms, and 
target motorcade remain supported in the Sub Saharan Africa model. As discussed previously, 
due to low counts in the target location categories for this model, the target inside category is 
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inclusive of the target being located at home or at work. This model thus finds that successful 
assassinations are less likely when the target is inside a physical building or structure during an 
attack compared to if they are located outside. However, due to the categories being condensed, 
it is not clear how to differentiate the impact of the target being located at home, work, or inside 
buildings other than these locations. 
Unlike the main model, an additional hypothesis is supported that is unique to the Sub 
Saharan Africa analysis. This model finds that contrary to what was hypothesized, successful 
assassinations are more likely to occur when security is present but does not respond compared 
to when no security is present at the scene of the attack. This result also contradicts the Southeast 
Asia model, which instead finds that the presence of security is significantly and negatively 
related to successful assassinations. This finding may indicate that assassinations that occur in 
Sub Saharan Africa are more chaotic than attacks that occur in Southeast Asia or other regions. 
Thus, when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists, perhaps they are unable to 
effectively return fire because they cannot determine where the terrorists are attacking from. 
Terrorist rewards are therefore increased when they can successfully inflict confusion at the 
scene of the attack to evade an effective security response and murder the target. As the open 
sources discuss, there are several examples of successful assassinations occurring as a result of 
terrorists creating confusion at the scene of the attack by using methods to isolate the target and 
their entourages, such as road closures. In one successful case, the terrorists effectively blocked 
the road that the target was travelling on with a tree trunk. Other successful attacks involve the 
terrorists blocking the road with their cars, enabling them to successfully gun down the target. 
Opportunities for terrorists to create confusion through the implementation of road closures 
illustrate the need for targets to frequently alter their daily routines, so terrorists will not be able 
125 
	
to become familiar with or predict which roads or routes that the target will use on any given 
day. Lastly, as previously detailed, this result demonstrates the need for security personnel to be 
sufficiently trained to respond to terrorists during attacks. Unlike the Southeast Asia model but 
similar to the full model and the other regional analyses, security personnel that are present but 
do not engage the terrorists are largely ineffective at disrupting successful assassinations. This 
highlights the need for detailed case studies and script analyses to further unravel and better 
understand these differences. 
 
CH. 8: LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Limitations  
Since the data utilized in this study are derived from open sources, some limitations are 
present. Assassination cases included in the GTD, as well as in the additional media outlets 
consulted, are more likely to account for incidents that occur in Western countries (LaFree et al., 
2015). Attacks that occur in autocratic countries, like North Korea or Russia, are most likely to 
be excluded from the GTD since the Western media has limited access to information on these 
countries (LaFree et al., 2015). The GTD may also include inaccuracies that are reported by the 
media, as well as lack detailed information on all attacks (LaFree et al., 2015). The GTD does 
not contain incidents that are unknown to the media, such as those that are disrupted or prevented 
by authorities. The GTD has been criticized for excluding state sponsored incidents of terrorism 
(LaFree et al., 2015). Coding errors represent another limitation with the GTD. For example, as 
the coding for SCP variables progressed in this study, a total of 37 cases were discovered to be 
incorrectly coded. Most of these coding errors related to the “success” variable, in that cases 
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were coded as unsuccessful when they were actually successful, and vice versa. While these 
errors do represent a limitation when relying on GTD data, they were easily reversed when they 
were discovered. In addition, of all 2,000 assassination cases examined, there were very few 
detected that suffered from these coding errors. Despite these critiques, the GTD still represents 
the most comprehensive and unclassified database on terrorism that exists (LaFree et al., 2015), 
and thus will continue to remain a valuable resource for assassination research.  
Overall, the main limitation of this research relates to the open source materials that were 
used to code for the new SCP specific variables. First, media reports for some of the incidents 
could not be found, so the SCP variables had to be coded based on the narrative variable 
provided in the GTD. The media reports of the assassination incidents also vary in terms of the 
detail provided. This ultimately resulted in some variables having to be excluded from the 
analyses altogether (i.e., the time of day control variable). This is a familiar limitation found in 
many studies that use open source materials (Meloy & Amman, 2016; Mandala & Freilich, 
2017a). For example, Meloy and Amman (2016) describe these issues in their study of public 
figure attacks using open source materials. Specifically, they explain how their sample is limited 
by not containing incidents that the media did not report.  
Additionally, the level of detail provided by the open sources varied across incidents 
(Meloy & Amman, 2016). Because the media reports on assassinations that were used for this 
study provided varying levels of detail, some assassination cases were very detailed while others 
had scant information available. This resulted in some variables containing missing values, 
thereby reducing the total sample size that could be analyzed in the full model. Sample size 
represents a potential limitation for the individual regional models, especially for the two regions 
with the smallest samples sizes (Southeast Asia and Sub Saharan Africa). Future research can 
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therefore utilize larger sample sizes for the region-specific analyses. While the open sources for 
each of the four regions appeared consistent in the level of detail provided, the sources for the 
Middle East & North Africa incidents tended to offer more detail compared to the incidents 
occurring in the other three regions. This could be a result of the Middle East & North Africa 
experiencing the greatest proportion of attacks, as well as the fact that the region gets much 
coverage by the international media due to its experience with terrorism. Not surprisingly, it was 
also observed that the incident detail provided by the open sources were more limited in the 
earlier years, specifically in the years prior to 2008. Finally, the results from the analyses 
conducted in this study are only applicable for the years examined (2005-2014). As a result, 
conclusions cannot be made from these findings about successful assassinations taking place 
during other time periods.  
 
Contributions to Literature, Research and Policy 
 This research investigates the value of the environmental criminology and SCP 
approaches in understanding the opportunities that facilitate successful terrorist assassinations as 
well as assisting the development of counterterrorism measures directed towards assassinations. 
Policy makers and law enforcement practitioners can apply this framework to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of what type of environment enables the occurrence of successful 
assassinations, and thus better allocate their counterterrorism resources. Successful attacks can 
be prevented or disrupted through the implementation of various measures developed from SCP. 
In addition to assisting policy makers and practitioners, this study contributes to the terrorism 
and criminology literature by applying SCP and environmental criminology to a topic that has 
been rarely explored by criminologists: terrorist assassinations. Since most of the assassination 
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literature remains in fields outside of criminology, and because most assassination studies have 
examined case studies, this dissertation contributes to the current assassination literature by using 
a quantitative approach to examine a large number of incidents spanning several years. The 
incorporation of additional SCP variables to the GTD enables a better operationalization of key 
SCP constructs, thus providing a fuller and more refined test of the framework. Additionally, 
since the existing assassination literature tends to focus on the individual assassin and their 
motivations, this study demonstrates how SCP can broaden our understanding of terrorism by 
focusing on the assassination event and the situations that enable successful attacks.  
By utilizing an innovative approach to develop new data, this study has important 
implications for future research on not only terrorism and assassinations, but for other terrorist 
tactics as well. The data and variables developed for this study can be further expanded and 
refined to analyze other attack types or more specific types of assassinations (i.e., assassinations 
of religious leaders). As noted earlier, research can expand off of this dissertation’s regional 
analyses to incorporate larger sample sizes for the regions that had fewer assassinations than 
others, like Sub-Saharan Africa. Expanding the sample sizes for these regions could potentially 
overcome the issue discussed previously regarding coverage bias in the open sources. In the 
process of conducting more refined regional tests, future studies may reveal that additional SCP 
variables or categories should be incorporated into the current dataset. For example, it may be 
discovered that “knives” should be added as a weapon type category. Thus, the dataset developed 
in this dissertation can evolve as the research on SCP and terrorism continues to grow.   
Although this study focuses on terrorist assassinations instead of assassinations 
committed by individuals not classified as terrorists, future research can explore the situational 
context in which non-terrorist assassinations occur. Doing so would allow researchers to 
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determine whether or not SCP factors have different effects on non-terrorist assassinations 
compared to terrorist assassinations as well as any possible diffusion or displacement effects. 
Since this study mainly applies routine activities and rational choice theory, future research can 
focus on crime pattern theory by applying spatial analyses to assassinations. This approach will 
help inform policy makers and practitioners with regards to the geographic and temporal patterns 
of assassinations. Researchers can expand off of this study by applying a similar approach of 
integrating open source materials to test other criminological frameworks, such as strain theory 
or social learning theory, to examine terrorist assassinations. Research can further extend this 
study by disaggregating assassinations, such as by target type or weapon type, to analyze even 
more specific forms of the tactic, as recommended by the SCP literature. Similarly, research can 
analyze other types of terrorist attacks, like kidnappings and suicide attacks, to determine 
whether or not the success of such tactics are influenced by similar or different SCP variables 
when compared to assassinations. As Clarke and Newman (2006) maintain, specificity is 
important in developing the most effective prevention measures. Thus, examining specific forms 
of assassinations can assist the development of even more tailored and effective prevention 
measures. It is thus evident that this study has the potential to not only inform counterterrorism 
practice and policy, but to also contribute to the assassination, terrorism, and criminology 
research literature.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation applies a criminological lens to the study of terrorist assassinations. In 
particular, the SCP and environmental criminology frameworks are used to quantitatively 
analyze a random sample of roughly 1,000 successful and 1,000 unsuccessful terrorist 
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assassination events taking place between 2005 and 2014. The GTD, as well as additional open-
source material, are used to analyze SCP specific variables through a binary logistic regression. 
The results from this study reflect how valuable environmental criminology and SCP can be in 
informing prevention measures directed towards disrupting successful terrorist assassinations.  
To summarize, the full regression model finds that successful assassinations are less 
likely when: security is present and responds to terrorists; sticky bombs are used; the target is in 
a motor vehicle when attacked; the target is at work or home when attacked; the target is in a 
motorcade; and when higher numbers of victims are struck (i.e., injuries and fatalities). 
Successful assassinations are more likely when: firearms are used; terrorists attack from a 
motorcycle; higher numbers of collateral deaths occur (i.e., deaths other than the target or 
terrorists); and when terrorists are in close proximity to their target. The regional models also 
contain some distinct findings compared to the full model. The Middle East and North Africa 
model finds that successful attacks are less likely when family of the target and bystanders are 
present during an attack. Successful assassinations are also more likely in the Middle East when 
suicide bombs are used. For the South Asia model, successful assassinations are more likely 
when multiple weapon types are used, as well as when weapon types other than firearms and 
explosives are used. In Southeast Asia, successful assassinations are less likely when security is 
present but does not respond to the terrorists. For the Sub Saharan Africa model, successful 
assassinations are more likely when security is present but does not respond to the terrorists.  
Several recommended measures directed towards disrupting and preventing successful 
assassinations are provided based off of SCP and environmental criminology. These measures 
include the following: having armed security personnel trained to effectively respond to 
terrorists; having proactive security and police personnel detect and defuse weapons, as well as 
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detect suspicious behavior before a terrorist can approach the target; implement strategically 
placed security checkpoints; install metal detectors at key entry and exit points; install electronic 
surveillance at locations where the target resides or works; use bullet-proof vehicles; have the 
target wear a bulletproof vest; implement firearms tracking and registration requirements; arm 
targets that have substantiated threats against them; vulnerable targets limit their time spent 
outside and among crowds without protection; limit the proximity of bystanders to the target; 
install barriers and fences in front of buildings where targets are located; have alert drivers who 
can employ evasive driving maneuvers if attacked; seat the target strategically in the vehicle (i.e., 
in the middle of the vehicle); implement traffic restrictions, road barriers and street closures to 
control access routes; limit the types of items and bags individuals can bring into venues 
susceptible to attacks; conduct periodic background checks on security personnel; have targets 
alter their daily travel routines; quickly clean up the scene of an assassination; and law 
enforcement and civilians should be aware of terrorists consistently changing their tactics. 
Overall, these recommendations highlight the need for target-hardening measures and other 
strategies to increase the effort and risks involved for terrorists, as well as decrease their rewards. 
When target, weapons, and tools opportunities for terrorists are reduced, the likelihood of an 
assassination being successful decreases. As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), 
terrorists will continue to analyze defenses and adapt their tactics when necessary. Protection 
measures make it more difficult for terrorists to be successful when they attack. As a result, these 
measures help to deter various types of terrorist attacks, including assassinations (9/11 













Attack occurred in capital city 
 
0 = Not in capital 
1 = In Capital 
 
-99 = Missing 
 






Day of week attack occurred 
 
1 = Monday 
2 = Tuesday 
3 = Wednesday 
4 = Thursday 
5 = Friday 
6 = Saturday 
7 = Sunday 
 






Was there more than one terrorist at the scene of the attack? 
 
0 = No, only one terrorist involved; no terrorist present (i.e., if 
only bomb, would be coded as 0 because no terrorists at scene of 
attack just bomb). 
1 = Yes, more than one terrorist involved 
 
-99 = Missing 
 
OthersAround Were others around during the attack 
 
0 = No one other than target/ terrorists/ security present 
1 = Only family of target present 
2 = Only bystanders present 
3 = Family and bystanders present 
 






Season attack occurred (Fall = reference) 
 
0 = Fall (September – November) 
1 = Winter (December – February) 
2 = Spring (March – May) 
3 = Summer (June – August) 
 






0 = No security guards present 
1 = Security guards present but no response 
2 = Security guards present and respond 
 





Terrorists attacked in close proximity to target (point-blank 
range; bomb hits target’s car; terrorists enter home and injure/kill 
target) 
 
0 = Not in close proximity to target 
1 = In close proximity to target 
 




Location of terrorists OR weapon used by terrorists during attack 
(i.e., sticky bomb would be coded as inside car; an IED placed 
inside a home would be coded as inside home, etc.) 
 
0 = Terrorists attacked while outside a physical building or 
structure (not in any motor vehicle) 
1 = Terrorists attacked from a motor vehicle 
2 = Terrorists attacked from a motorcycle 
3 = Terrorists attacked while inside a building/structure 
4 = Terrorists attacked from elsewhere 
 
-99 = Missing  
 
TargetLoc Location of target during the attack 
 
0 = Target outside 
1 = Target in motor vehicle 
2 = Target on motorcycle 
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3 = Target inside building or structure (that is not work or home) 
4 = Target at work 
5 = Target at home 
6 = Target at other location 
 
-99 = Missing 
 
TargetMotorcade 
Target attacked while in motorcade or convoy 
 
0 = Not in motorcade 
1 = In motorcade 
 







Was the target an official (government) or unofficial (private 
citizen) target? 
 
0 = Government (diplomatic and general) 
1 = Journalists 
2 = Military 
3 = Police 
4 = Private citizens 
5 = Religious figures 
6 = Terrorists / Non-state militia 
7 = Violent political party 
8 = Other (airports, business, education, NGO, transportation) 
 
-99 = Missing 
 
OfficialTarget Was the target an official (government) or unofficial (private 
citizen) target? 
 
0 = Unofficial target 
1 = Official target 
 
-99 = Missing 
 
TimeDay Time of day that attack occurred 
 
 
1 = 12:00 am – 05:59 am 
2 = 06:00 am – 11:59 am 
3 = 12:00 pm – 05:59 pm 













Weapon type used during attack 
 
0 = Explosives (not sticky bomb or suicide) 
1 = Firearms 
2 = Sticky bombs 
3 = Suicide bombs 
4 = More than one weapon type used 
5 = Other weapon type used 
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